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This research uses a historical comparative analysis to investigate the differences  
between two specific Muslim-majority regions of Thailand: the province of Satun, along 
the western coast of southern Thailand, and provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani, and 
Songkhla, which border the Malaysian state of Kelantan and the Gulf of Thailand.  
The formation of ethnic identities in Satun and Patani has followed different paths 
over time, and these variations in development have produced dramatically divergent 
outcomes in relation to observable communal violence and terrorist attacks. Satun has 
virtually no problem with ethnic or religious conflict when compared to the four other 
southern provinces that have suffered from multiple rebellions against the state, 
numerous incidents of violence and terrorism, and a pervading sense of instability and 
fear.  
This pronounced difference in outcomes also reflects the degree to which various 
ethnic groups within the country have been able to integrate peacefully into the modern 
Thai state. Finally, an analysis of the Thai government’s effectiveness in managing this 
integration process in both regions will provide insight into providing effective 
governance throughout the contested regions of southern Thailand, and what the potential 
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I. ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN SOUTHERN THAILAND: THE 
ANOMALY OF SATUN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Major Research Question 
Thailand’s southern provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, Pattani, and Songkhla (which 
in the course of this paper will be referred to collectively as the “Patani region”1) have 
suffered from a long record of unrest, violence, and strife that seems to have no end in 
sight.2 This low-intensity conflict historically revolves around the societal cleavages that 
exist between the greater Buddhist majority within the country and the smaller 
populations of Thai Muslims of Malay descent who live along the Thai-Malaysian 
border.3 The trajectory of this violence also rose dramatically during 2004–2006, when 
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra adopted a much harsher approach towards the region. 
However, by declaring martial law in the region, deploying additional military and police 
forces to “keep the peace,” and suspending constitutional rights via an “emergency 
                                                 
1 Historically, the name “Patani” is frequently used to describe the Islamic Sultante of Patani that 
existed in Southern Thailand from 1516–1902. Conversely, the name “Pattani” is usually used in a more 
modern context to refer to the Thai province of Pattani that first fell under Thai administrative control in 
1909. The term “Patani” is highly charged with ethnic and political meaning for a large number of Muslims 
in southern Thailand because it harkens back to previous eras of independence, power, and eminence that 
the Patani Sultante possessed before it was subjected to Siamese assimilation and control. In this paper I 
will use the term “Patani region” to designate the collective geographic area contained within the provinces 
of Songkhla, Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani. This particular geographic area has been the central pilllar of 
several movements in southern Thailand to create an autonomous or independent Islamic state on a number 
of different occasions. 
2 Max L. Gross, A Muslim Archipelago:  Islam And Politics In Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: 
National Defense Intelligence College, March 2007), 75.  
3 In the context of this paper, I will refer to various Muslim populations by their geographic location in 
order to reduce the confusion associated with distinguishing different Muslim groups from each other. For 
example, “Kelantan Muslims” are Malay Muslims from Malaysia who live in the state of Kelantan. The 
“Pattani Muslims” are Muslims from the Thai province of Pattani who predominantly speak a Malay 
dialect known as “Jawi” and maintain very close cultural ties and similarities to the Kelantan Muslims who 
live to the south of the Thai-Malaysian border. The Satun Muslims (or “Sam Sams”) are Muslims from the 
Thai province of Satun who predominantly speak the predominant Thai national language. These 
geographic and ethnic differences have been critical in the formation of cultural identities and the resulting 
history of violence in southern Thailand over the past several hundred years. Referring to communities of 
people by their region and religion, i.e., Pattani Muslim, is for convenience. Unless otherwise stressed, it 
does not imply that Islam is a politically salient identity at that time or that grievances are necessarily about 
religion at a point in time. When Islam is an important factor, that point will be made directly.  
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decree,” he exacerbated tensions between Bangkok and Patani.4 After Thaksin was 
removed by a military coup in 2006, many observers hoped that new initiatives for 
reform and reconciliation could take place. Unfortunately, violence in the region has 
continued unabated and the Thai government still struggles to peacefully resolve this 
situation. Although the violence has not returned to the same levels as 2004–2006, it 
remains a serious problem. As of 2012, it is estimated that the southern Thailand 
insurgency has inflicted over 5,700 deaths and roughly 12,000 injured within Muslim and 
Buddhist communities alike over the course of the last seven years.5  
In the midst of these troubles, the Thai province of Satun stands out as a curious 
anomaly. Despite possessing many similarities to the other Muslim communities in the 
region, this single area has not had any serious outbreaks of religious or ethnic violence. 
Researchers who have investigated this region frequently report that Satun’s diverse 
ethnic and religious communities do not experience the same levels of distrust and 
violence that are found in the Patani region. In a larger sense, this same trend for 
nonviolence between the local populations in Satun also extends to Satun’s interactions 
with the Thai government. Compared to the other provinces of southern Thailand, 
Satun’s relationship with Bangkok lacks the distinct undertones of confrontation, 
separatism, and frustration that is common in Narathiwat, Yala, Pattani, and Songkhla.6 
What has caused this divergent outcome in Satun? Is it a result of long standing historical 
or geographical factors that are unique and nontransferable? Are there particular aspects 
of the cultural identity found within the province of Satun that have led its citizens to 
denounce violence and accordingly refuse to let these conflicts take root in their 
communities? Did it fail to arise because Satun did not suffer from the same biased 
government policies, political mismanagement, and skewed center-periphery relations 
 
                                                 
4 Sunai Phasuk, “Emergency Decree Creates Climate of Fear in Southern Thailand,” Thailand 
Monitor, Feb 8, 2006, http://www.thaiworld.org/en/thailand_monitor/answer.php?question_id=266. 
5 Srisompob Jitpiromsri, “The Obvious Trend of Violence’s Intensification in the Deep South Over 7 
Years.” DeepSouthWatch, April 5, 2011,  http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/1603. 




that existed between Patani and Bangkok? Or has this condition simply developed due to 
decisions that local individuals are making in terms of rational choices and possible 
economic incentives?  
This thesis will investigate some of the explanations for the lack of conflict within 
Satun, compare them against the larger body of research that has been conducted on the 
more restive areas of southern Thailand, and attempt to draw some conclusions as to why 
this Muslim-majority province has not experienced the same levels of violence that have 
been endemic in other predominantly Muslim provinces. This comparison is intriguing 
because while many researchers have focused exclusively on describing and explaining 
the ongoing violence within Patani, very few analysts have conducted inquiries about 
Satun and attempted to explain why there is a pronounced absence of strife in this 
particular area. By conducting this inquiry we may be able to gain additional insight on 
the nature of the conflict in southern Thailand, and why the inhabitants of Satun and the 
Patani region have pursued such dramatically different courses of action over the years. 
2. Importance  
This issue has profound impacts on both the citizens of Thailand, as well as the 
Thai government that is charged with maintaining order and safety within the country. 
For the inhabitants of southern Thailand, at its most primal level, this concern is tied to 
having safe communities for local citizens and families to live in. For many of these 
southern communities, it is impossible for people to go about their daily activities such as 
attend school or pursue their livelihoods, without the fear of being bombed or shot in 
some sort of random attack. In a larger sense, this significance is also about the potential 
for larger conflicts to develop between different ethnic or religious groups. Satun is quite 
interesting in this regard due to the lack of friction between local Muslim and Buddhist 
communities. Unfortunately, this has not been the case in Narathiwat, Yala, Patani, and 
Songkhala, and several authors have commented on the nascent Buddhist “militarization” 
within these particular provinces.7 This is an alarming trend, as it may add an additional 
                                                 
7 Michael Jerryson, Buddhist Warfare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 189. 
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religious dimension to the conflict within southern Thailand. In doing so, it could begin 
to expand this problem from an ethno-separatist issue that has been directed against the 
Thai government to a wider problem that could either increasingly define the conflict as a 
“Buddhist-Muslim” struggle, or possibly even attract the attention and involvement of 
external Jihadi influences from abroad.  
From a macro perspective, the absence or presence of conflict within the country 
has widespread implications for the Thai government as well. First, there is the simple 
desire to maintain civil order and the rule of law within the country. This stability may be 
threatened however if the local citizenry has a strong sense that a schism exists between 
what they should be entitled to and what the state actually provides for them. This 
frustration can build up to levels where people will attempt to find some sort of 
alternative method to resolve this conflict they are experiencing in their lives.8 They may 
try to use the existing political and judicial systems in an attempt to gain some measure of 
redress. If this is not possible, they may decide to “exit,” or commit to a strategy in which 
their social group flees the area entirely. They might simply stop participating in the 
national system, or worst of all, an aggrieved population may also engage in acts of 
violence against targets that they perceive as being the cause of their suffering. In 
southern Thailand, this targeting process frequently appears to have been directed against 
agencies of the government: military units, police forces, government officials and 
offices, schools, teachers, and Buddhist temples for example. Innocent citizens often get 
caught up in this conflict as well if they are seen as being on an “opposing” side.9 If we 
compare these frightening conditions found in Patani to Satun, we can see that there are 
much closer ties between the central government and the provincial leaders in the latter 
region. This cooperative relationship in Satun has proven to be extremely productive 
within various initiatives such as political participation, conflict resolution, and economic 
development to include upgrading port facilities and supporting tourism.   
                                                 
8 Theda Skocpol, States & Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia & China 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 9. 
9 Neil J. Melvin, “Conflict in Southern Thailand: Islamism, Violence and the State in the Patani 
Insurgency,” SIPRI Policy Paper No. 20, September 2007, 26–27. 
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Having a peacefully integrated Buddhist–Muslim community also reduces the 
need for a constant presence of police and military forces to enforce local law and order. 
Achieving peace in Patani would allow the Thai government to allocate its national 
resources to other areas, such as the conflict along the Thailand-Cambodia border or 
thwarting drug-trafficking and arms smuggling. The scale and scope of this drain on 
Thailand’s national resources is substantial: in the wake of ongoing security concerns in 
the south the Thai government has dedicated in excess of 60,000 military personnel and 
police officers throughout Narathiwat, Yala, Patani, and Songkhala to deal with the 
ongoing violence.10 This fact is a dramatic counterpoint to the case of Satun, where 
visitors often note the conspicuous absence of roadblocks, military checkpoints, and 
armed government patrols.  
Uncontrolled conflict within Thailand can also affect how other external countries 
and individuals see the Thai nation and decide to interact with it. For example, tourism 
alone in Thailand represents up to 7.9 percent of the national Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). The spread of violence and instability could create a situation in which the larger 
global community may begin to view the country as a dangerous and risky place to 
conduct business or visit.11 On a political or international relations level, this problem can 
have direct impacts on Thailand’s relationships with neighboring Muslim countries such 
as Malaysia or Indonesia. This exact type of scenario played out in 2005 when 131 
refugees from southern Thailand fled to Malaysia seeking asylum after they felt that their 
lives were in danger if they remained in Patani.12 As a result of this incident, the 
Malaysian government broke away from the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) “noninterference” norms and refused to return the refugees to the Thai 
government. Malaysia also publicly questioned Thailand’s treatment of its ethnic 
                                                 
10 International Crisis Group. “Stalemate in Southern Thailand,” Asia Briefing, no. 113, November 3, 
2010, 1. 
11 Jon Fernquest, “Income generated by Thailand’s tourism sector to be measured in greater detail,” 
The Bangkok Post, August 27, 2010, “http://www.readbangkokpost.com/easybusinessnews 
/hotels_restaurants_and_tourism/income_generated_by_thailands.php. 
12 Peter Hourdequin, “Malaysia’s 2005–2006 refugee stand-off with Thailand: a security culture 
analysis,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 8, no. 2 (2007): 176–177. 
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minorities in the south and appealed to the United Nation’s High Council on Refugees to 
intervene in the situation within southern Thailand, all of which caused the international 
community to view the Thai government in an extremely negative light. 
3. Problems and Hypotheses 
This paper proposes three main hypotheses as to why Satun has evolved over the 
years into a predominantly nonviolent province compared to the other southern provinces 
that have not:  
1. Satun displays unique history and cultural components that have fostered a 
much different local ethnic identity and corresponding relationship to the 
Thai government than what is found the Patani provinces. Satun was 
actually part of a different and less powerful Muslim Sultanate known as 
Kedah, rather than the more robust Patani Sultanate, that was the 
predecessor of the modern day provinces of the other southern Malay 
Muslim communities. Due to this divergent history, the Patani Muslims 
have maintained a different cultural identity as Malay Muslims and 
maintain a much greater sense of loss at the hands of the Thai government 
than the Muslims in Satun.  
2. Because the Satun region assimilated more easily to the Thai 
government’s institutional objectives (such as embracing nationalism and 
secular education), it did not garner the harsh repression and enforcement 
measures that were utilized in Patani. Conversely, the Thai government 
has failed to appreciate the differences between Satun and Patani noted in 
hypothesis (1). As a result, the Thai government’s policies of subjugation 
and assimilation in the Patani region have been perceived by the Malay 
Muslims as a policy of cultural annihilation. 
3. Due to the influences of a divergent ethnic identity and a different reaction 
to the government institutions noted in hypotheses (1) and (2), the 
inhabitants of Satun did not develop extensive lists of grievances against 
the Thai government. As a result, Satun’s residents had no incentive to 
utilize violence against Bangkok and, in fact, the residents of Satun have 
specifically rejected the use of violence because of the negative effects 
such a choice would cause on their individual and communal lives. 
The first hypothesis is focused on several formative cultural factors, such as 
history, language, and religion. An examination of these elements will allow us to see 
how they have caused a much different ethnic identity to develop in Satun when 
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compared to the ethnic identity that has been formed in Narathiwat, Yala, Patani, and 
Songkhla. The immense power of these cultural identities, and how they can propel 
groups to pursue different courses of action (such as violence) in response to external 
pressures, has been examined in a number of different social identity theories. There is 
little doubt that these cultural factors have provided a strong foundation for shaping the 
conditions we find in Satun today; however, culture alone cannot completely explain this 
phenomenon and there are most likely other factors at work here as well. 
The second hypothesis proposes that the core of existing historical and cultural 
conditions within these two regions were subsequently greatly influenced by the 
interactions they have had with various institutions and policies that were implemented 
by the Thai government. Factors, such as the implementation of national education 
programs, center-periphery relationships, political representation, and the activities of 
domestic security forces, have been critical in either reducing or aggravating the potential 
for violence in southern Thailand. In many regards, these policies from Bangkok were 
viewed as less coercive and intrusive by the population in Satun than they were by the 
other southern provinces so Satun had a much lower amount of public discontent and 
grievances that were directed against the Thai government. 
The third hypothesis is based on rational choice theories. Rational choice states 
that many individual actors will make decisions based on the relative utility gained from 
these calculations and resulting decisions. In both Satun and Patani, rational choice 
revolves around the utility of violence as a means to achieve collective goals. Unlike the 
Muslims in Patani, the Muslims of Satun have not pursued violence against the 
government due to a lack of widespread grievances and the belief that violence would 
only bring more problems than the potential benefits this course of action might provide. 
Despite a common religious linkage between the two regions, Satun sees the option of 
joining in a larger Muslim resistance with their Malay neighbors as having no inherent 
value or benefits that can be realized. Rather, this type of choice would only bring 
destruction and suffering into the communities of Satun much like they have in Patani. 
By comparison, in the Patani region, many observers believe that violence has become 
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viewed as a rationally calculated choice by local Muslim nationalist or insurgent groups, 
such as Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), Pattani United Liberation Organization 
(PULO), Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP), or the United Front for the 
Independence of Pattani (Bersatu). Due to the fact that the standard methods of conflict 
resolution, these groups have attempted (such as political participation, legal redress, 
nonviolent protest, or social exit) have frequently proven to be ineffective, or even put 
them at greater risk of being targeted by either government forces or other opposing 
insurgent and militant groups in the region, violence has become the “tool of last resort” 
to bring attention to their grievances.  
4. Literature Review  
The importance of cultural differences as a potential cause of ethnic violence has 
been widely discussed in many books, articles, and research papers. One of the most 
renowned contributions was made by Samuel Huntington in his work “The Clash of 
Civilizations.”13 This particular piece was extremely controversial when it was published 
in 1993, and it still has a certain degree of relevance today due to the fact that it describes 
the deep rooted impacts of cultural dichotomy, particularly religious divisions, in 
fomenting conflict. In the case of southern Thailand, some observers have theorized that 
Islamic extremism or Jihadism may be one of the primary causes of the violence that is 
taking place in the region. In many regards, it appears that Huntington’s theories are 
invalidated in the particular case of Satun, due to the mixed communities of Muslims and 
Buddhists who live in close proximity, yet do not engage in violent behavior towards 
each other. Huntington has also been heavily criticized by other observers, such as 
Edward W. Said, who felt that Huntington’s theories were oversimplified, neglected the 
finer details and nuances of human interactions, and that this one dimensional analysis of 
social interactions (i.e., declaring that religion is the only independent variable that 
                                                 
13 Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3, (1993): 25. 
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matters) did not consider other factors that could contribute to social friction, such as 
language, politics,  grievances, or the absence of viable dispute resolution methods.14 
Another theoretical viewpoint on the impacts of culture and religion on southern   
Thailand has been described by Surin Pitsuwan, a widely respected Thai academic, 
author, and politician, who is currently serving as the 12th Secretary General of the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). In his view, the role of Islam within 
the country has been marginalized and eclipsed in many regards by the larger cosmology 
of the Buddhist majority government. Particularly during the period of intensive “nation 
building” from 1902–1957, the Thai government aggressively promoted the beliefs of 
“Buddhism,” “King,” and “Nation,” and anyone who did not subscribe to these same 
values was not considered part of the larger group of legitimate Thai citizens. Instead, the 
Patani Muslims who did not subscribe to these new norms were frequently viewed with 
both suspicion and disdain, and even identified or labeled as a potential threat (e.g., 
“separatists”) to the survival of the new national construct. For the Patani region, this 
forced cultural identity being imposed by the Thai government threatened its inhabitants 
with the distinct possibility of cultural extinction. This threat became a focal point for 
dissent and resistance in Patani, as it amounted to a request for the Muslims in these 
provinces to give up the cultural identity and beliefs that they had practiced for 
generations, a sacrifice that they were not prepared to make. As a result, Pitsuwan claims 
that the Thai government’s attempts at “…national integration is synonymous with 
cultural disintegration from the perspective of many Malay Muslims.”15 In many regards, 
this threat of “cultural disintegration” has sparked deeply rooted reactions of fear and 
resistance and has led Patani Muslims to pursue a wide range of reactions to alleviate 
these concerns, including violence.  
The role of nationalism in creating a strong central identity and the potential for 
intra-group conflict can also be seen in various works by authors, such as Benedict 
                                                 
14 Edward W. Said, “The Clash of Ignorance,” The Nation, October 22, 2001, 
http://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance?page=0,2. 
15 Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay nationalism: a case study of Malay-Muslims of southern Thailand 
(Bangkok: Thammasat University, 1985), 8. 
10 
 
Anderson and Craig Reynolds. Anderson explores many of the cultural explanations that 
revolve around values and beliefs, such as the concept of “imagined communities.” By 
examining how societies develop these notional constructs, Anderson feels that it is 
possible to describe why these types of behaviors can be so powerful in mobilizing 
populations to adhere to, and enforce, a singular concept of “being.”16 The “Tomb of the 
Unknown Soldier” for example, is cited by Anderson as an example of how a society can 
imprint ideas and values upon the larger group even when the idea itself is not based on 
any concrete reality. This adherence to a national identity can also intertwine with 
religion or modes of social communication or symbols in order to satisfy the desire for a 
cohesive, strong state.  
Many times, a mythology (such as the concept of the “Unknown Soldier”) that is 
built up by the national leadership can often cause an increasing importance to be placed 
upon language or written documents to reinforce these beliefs and collective identity.17 
Anderson’s claim in this regard is particularly intriguing because Thailand followed this 
exact same strategic process in building a national identity by implementing standardized 
languages, political administration systems, and cultural narratives designed by Bangkok 
in order to bind the country together against several perceived external threats.  
Another more recent and holistic use of cultural analysis in order to explain and 
understand violence, especially in the realm of counter insurgency and conflict 
management, has been utilized by the United States military after combat operations in 
theaters, such as Afghanistan and Iraq since 2003. One example of this trend toward a 
deeper understanding of culture is a DoD publication entitled “Operational Culture for 
the Warfighter” written by Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber. This document 
expands the modern day importance of this field of study and how it relates to the 
challenges it can create during the planning process for military operations. Instead of 
simply defining culture as a struggle between competing ideologies or ethnicities, 
                                                 
16 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso Editions, 1983), 50.  
17 Ibid., 54. 
11 
 
Salmoni and Holmes-Eber organize their framework into five interlocking “dimensions” 
that include the physical environment, economic considerations, social structures, 
political organization, and belief systems.18 Although this framework for cultural analysis 
overlaps several of the theoretical models used in this paper, it is an another evolutionary 
step forward from Huntington’s work in recognizing the fact that culture consists or more 
than just a conflict between religions. Instead, cultural identity is a collective, subjective, 
and intricate construct that is linked to a myriad of human activities. The manifestation of 
these constructs revolves around the values, norms, beliefs, and attitudes that a society 
maintains within each of these five dimensions. This identity can also change over time 
and be defined much differently between various groups or geographic locations.19  
In Kobuka Suwannathat-Pian’s 2008 article entitled “National Identity, the Sam-
Sams of Satun, and the Thai Malay Muslims,” the author provides an excellent narrative 
of the historical development and demographics of Satun that over the years have created 
a unique cultural identity within this particular province, particularly in regards to 
linguistics. Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian argues that language has been one of the critical 
factors in how the Satun Muslims have been differentiated from the Patani Muslims by 
many different political leaders, ethnographers, researchers, and visitors to the two 
different regions. In fact, the name or label applied to the Muslims in Satun (“Sam-
Sams”) was a truncation of the label “Siam Islam.” This name was frequently used by 
Thai leaders and neighboring communities to categorize the religious convictions and 
ethnic identity of the inhabitants of Satun as Muslims who spoke Thai in order to 
differentiate them from either the Thai speaking Buddhists or the Patani Muslims who 
spoke an entirely different dialect altogether.20  
In a similar fashion, Thomas Parks also discussed the impact of cultural 
influences within Satun in a 2009 article he wrote for Small Wars and Insurgencies. This 
                                                 
18 Barak Salmomi and Paula Holmes-Eber, Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and 
Applications (Quantico: Marine Corps University Press, 2008), 51. 
19 Ibid., 36. 
20 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, “‘National Identity, the Sam-Sams of Satun, and the Thai Malay 
Muslims.”In Thai South and Malay  North: Ethnic Interactions on a Plural Peninsula, ed. Michael J. 
Montesano et al. (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2008), 159. 
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particular article makes a convincing argument that in addition to the cultural influences 
of language, history, and religion, these cultural explanations are intertwined with several 
institutional elements in order to explain why Satun has remained peaceful for so many 
years. According to Parks, some examples of these institutional elements at work in 
Satun is the fact that the Thai government allowed Satun to maintain a higher degree of 
political autonomy, especially during the critical years of 1902–1934, than what was 
allowed in Patani. The Thai government also did not employ an extensive and aggressive 
military presence in the province of Satun to repress local citizens, which helped to 
prevent grievances from developing in the region.21 As many researchers have noted in 
case studies of other countries, once popular grievances begin to “snowball” and reach a 
certain critical mass, they can be easily used as a catalyst for social mobilization and the 
use of violence in a quest for justice or a resolution of these problems. These specific 
interactions mentioned by Parks are just a few aspects of how the Thai government has 
maintained a much less repressive or intrusive presence in Satun than they did in the 
Patani region. This “soft” approach also facilitated positive working relationships 
between the Thai government located in Bangkok and Satun and allowed the “national 
narrative” to take root much more easily in this area.  
Supara Janchitfah also described a large number of these institutional factors 
(such as economic development, educational systems, and the provision for regional 
security) in her book entitled Violence in the Mist: Reporting on the Presence of Pain in 
Southern Thailand. In this work, she has described how the government’s role in 
managing local schools, natural resource allocation, and municipal and state law 
enforcement activities is critical in mitigating the spread of alienation, frustration, and 
anger that can lead to violence.22 Supara’s arguments are closely linked to theories about 
centralism as a political structure of management and control. Centralism holds that the 
government will concentrate its power in a core region and then radiate agencies of 
                                                 
21 Thomas I. Parks, “Maintaining Peace in a Neighbourhood Torn by Separatism: The Case of Satun 
Province in Southern Thailand” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 20, no. 1 (2009): 196–197. 
22 Supara Janchitfah,  Violence in the Mist: Reporting on the Presence of Pain in Southern Thailand  
(Bangkok, Thailand: Kobfai Publishing Project, 2004), 54. 
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control out towards the edges of the state. In this fashion, the dynamics of center-
periphery relations are created in various areas such as elected leadership, economics, or 
the urban-rural divide. For example, in Thailand, the centrally located metropolitan 
capital of Bangkok often selects politicians and government officials from the capital 
region and then sends them out to the more rural hinterlands of the country to execute 
their duties. Although this extends the control of the center, it can also create a schism 
between the central representatives and the local populations that see this appointment 
process as both overly invasive and causing local political decisions to be directly 
controlled by “outsiders.”  
Joseph Liow has focused on the importance of certain institutional factors in 
shaping the violence in southern Thailand as well. Much of his research revolves around 
the establishment of educational systems in Thailand and the various differences between 
state-sponsored schools and local Muslim pondoks that have become serious points of 
contention between Patani Muslim communities and the central government. As Liow 
points out, the Thai government has repeatedly attempted to mandate both curriculum 
and language training that were seen by the government as critical to building a national 
concept of being “Thai” and creating a homogeneous society of like-minded individuals. 
Two other critical components of this assimilation process has been adhering to common 
religious beliefs and displaying an unwavering loyalty to the Thai monarchy. Buddhism 
is practiced by more than 80 percent of Thai citizens, and for many years was actually 
mandated as the official religion within the country. It was not until the drafting of the 
1997 constitution that this official status of Buddhism as a national religion was revised 
and a larger degree of religious freedom was allowed within Thailand.23 Unwavering 
respect for the monarchy was another aspect of this indoctrination as well; an act as 
simple as saying anything negative about the king or marring an image of him could 
result in a lese majesty conviction and a possible confinement of three to fifteen years in 
prison. Unfortunately, these efforts by the national government to impose common 
                                                 
23 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, “‘National Identity, the Sam-Sams of Satun, and the Thai Malay 
Muslims.” In Thai South and Malay  North: Ethnic Interactions on a Plural Peninsula, ed. Michael J. 
Montesano et al. (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2008), 155. 
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educational, religious, or allegiance to Thailand’s monarchy were seen by local Muslim 
leaders in Patani as failing to provide the elements of morality and religious 
fundamentalism within education that were seen as essential in developing young Patani 
children into proper Muslim adults. This struggle between the government and local 
leaders over educational institutions became yet another flashpoint for grievances to 
fester over the years. This contentious environment has caused many separatist and 
insurgent organizations to make attempts at exploiting these educational institutions as an 
effective means of recruiting people into their cause and advocating violence to defend 
their beliefs.24 
Duncan McCargo is perhaps one of the most prolific authors within this field of 
study, and he has investigated a number of possible causes for this conflict. In particular, 
McCargo has focused on the issue of governance and institutional frameworks, such as 
widespread abuses by Royal Thai Police or the forced nationalist agendas of assimilation, 
that have caused segments of Thailand’s population to see the Thai government as 
seriously lacking any semblance of legitimate authority. He is quick to argue against 
singular explanations, and in a particularly scathing article from 2008, McCargo 
describes his contention that the common perception of the southern conflict in Thailand 
as “a coherent and expansionist radical regional Islamist movement is deeply flawed.”25 
Due to the opaque nature of this conflict and its participants, McCargo points out that 
there have been a number of different explanations fielded at various times and venues, 
but nothing has ever proven to be concrete or positively identified to date.26 In Tearing 
Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand (2008), McCargo provides a 
veritable laundry list of potential explanations for the violence in southern Thailand:  
 
                                                 
24 Joseph Liow, Islam, Education and Reform in Southern Thailand: Tradition & Transformation 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 34. 
25 Duncan McCargo, “What’s Really Happening In Southern Thailand?” (paper presented at ISEAS 
Regional Forum, January 8, 2008). 
26 Duncan McCargo, Tearing Apart The Land: Islam and Legitimacy In Southern Thailand (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 2008), 6. 
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1. It has been caused by rampant criminal activity and drug dealers;  
2. Violence resulted from grievances over economic deprivation or societal 
marginalization;  
3. The conflict was driven by a persistent toxic political environment and 
ineffective leadership;  
4. Strife resulted from the increased presence of external Jihadist influences 
within Thailand, such as JI or ASF operatives that are attempting to 
expand their Islamic front; 
5. Fighting increased dramatically in recent years due to particularly gross 
government mismanagement of the situation in southern Thailand during 
the years of 2004–2006;  
6. Recent violence is possibly linked to a resurgence of various separatist 
activities that were originally prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Although many of these arguments are compelling, McCargo opines they may not 
be helping us to gain an entirely accurate picture of the situation. In his opinion, one of 
the most critical components of this issue is that of governance and legitimacy.27 Without 
this most basic component of civil society, in which a recognized contract between the 
governed and the governing has been established and agreed upon by all parties, the 
hopes of achieving a lasting peace in this conflict are extremely low. This theme is a 
common one and has several linkages back to arguments made by other researchers about 
the role of the national government in creating conditions that can either reduce the 
conflict or perhaps aggravate it. 
The last analytical framework that will be used to examine Satun’s peaceful 
propensities falls under the umbrella of Rational Choice. Authors such as Mancur Olson, 
Peter Chalk, or Anthony Davis have argued that although cultural and structural 
arguments carry a great deal of weight within this discussion, we cannot ignore the 
propensity of human beings to often engage in activities or decisions that will benefit 
them in the long run.  
                                                 
27 Duncan McCargo, Tearing Apart The Land: Islam and Legitimacy In Southern Thailand (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 2008), 183. 
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Mancur Olson wrote many of his observations, articles, and books several 
decades ago but these documents still have many important theories that are applicable to 
the conflict in southern Thailand and elsewhere. In The Logic of Collective Action: Public 
Goods and the Theory of Groups (1971), Olson comments on the relative effectiveness of 
large and small groups, and how smaller groups are often much more tightly knit in terms 
of reaching a consensus on goals and beliefs.28 In addition to comparing the actions and 
effectiveness of large groups and small groups, Olson also emphasizes the importance 
that people place on gaining prestige, respect, friendship, or other social and 
psychological motivations. It seems that the separatist narrative is closely linked to this 
type of logic in that groups such as BRN or PULO hope to regain a sense of the glory and 
prestige that the Patani sultanate once enjoyed. Unified by purpose and intent, it seems 
that this type of model Olson purposes could also be used to explain why the residents of 
Satun have explicitly denounced the use of violence, as well as why the Patani separatist 
groups, such as BRN or PULO, have allegedly continued to reject any alliances with 
larger outside groups, such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) or Abu Sayyaf (ASF) despite the 
possible benefits this cooperation might bring. There appears to be an intense motivation 
on the part of the Patani insurgent groups to “keep it local” and avoid being co-opted by 
larger organizations. 
Peter Chalk is another researcher who has touched upon the possible impacts of 
rational choice motivation in the utilization of violence. In one particular interview, 
Chalk had conducted for his article “The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A 
Net Assessment,” (2009) a former PULO commander commented on the decision making 
process that was driving the violence within the country in both years past and the current 
era saying:  
I fought for years in the jungle against the Thai state. I am still very much 
a[n Ethnic Malay Muslim] nationalist and still dream of a free Patani 
Darulsalam. I will never hesitate to take up arms to fight again. But not  
 
 
                                                 
28 Mancur Olson, The Logic Of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1971), 53–65. 
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like this, not the way this generation is conducting it. It seems like they are 
just killing for killing’s sake- creating fear to increase their power and 
control our people.29 
This statement is intriguing in many regards because it provides rational choice 
motivations from this respondent for both the reasoning behind enlisting in historic 
separatist struggles (to gain independence), as well as what the possible motivations may 
be for the new generations of insurgents that are operating within Patani (the pursuit of 
power and local prestige).  
Anthony Davis pursues the impetus of rational choice decision making from a 
more economic perspective, particularly in regards to the influence of smuggling or black 
market economies. In his article from 2005, Davis argues that the sea lines of 
communication (SLOCs) along the western coasts of Thailand are major avenues for 
weapons and narcotics smuggling into other various conflict regions such as Aceh or 
Mindanao.30 As a result of this economic flow, there are possibly elements of the local 
government, security organizations, and business interests that may be keeping the local 
security situation in Satun under control in order to avoid the presence of Thai national 
military or law enforcement elements that might stifle these illicit avenues of income. 
Another possible extension of economically based rational choice theories is that 
legitimate sources of economic incentives such as tourism or infrastructure monies 
received from the central government may be a consideration for leaders and 
communities in Satun to avoid violence and instability. 
5. Methods and Sources 
The question of Satun’s peaceful nature in comparison to Patani will be conducted 
throughout this thesis as a comparative case study. By examining the various differences 
between Satun and Patani, we can begin to see the divergent patterns that exist between 
these two areas which may have aggravated the proliferation of violence in some areas 
                                                 
29 Peter Chalk, Angel Rabasa, William Rosenau, and Leanne Piggott.   The Evolving Terrorist Threat 
To Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 22.  
30 Anthony Davis, “Satun Escapes The Grip of Thai Violence That is Blighting South,” Jane’s 
Intelligence Review (2005): 4. 
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and prevented it in others. My inquiry relates most directly to the study of history and 
sociology, although there is a certain degree of overlap in this approach with the fields of 
ethnic conflict studies and political science as well. There are both advantages and 
disadvantages to pursuing this type of methodology. Mill’s method of difference and the 
use of small N case studies offer us a simple theoretical framework to identify the likely 
cause of dissimilar outcomes in apparently similar cases. Unfortunately, as Arend 
Lijphart points out, this type of approach carries some degree of risk.31 For example, 
there are many variables to be examined, but only a small number of cases to do so with. 
It is also important to realize that this type of methodology will not provide a 
probabilistic explanation, but can only help us to reach more deterministic conclusions 
about what may be causing this phenomenon. With this being said, there are still some 
benefits available to researchers using this type of approach as the comparison of intra-
area conflict can “…be of great value since certain political processes will be compared 
between units within the area against a common background of similar trait 
configuration.”32 
Most of the information for this thesis has been obtained from secondary sources, 
including books, scholarly journals, research articles, and magazines. The Internet also 
provided an excellent resource to access information found in newspapers such as the The 
Nation or The Bangkok Post. These types of publication have frequently published 
current information on events such as insurgent attacks, political dialogue or debate, and 
civil-military relations which can provide extremely relevant insights into this problem as 
well as documenting past events that have taken place within the Thai government and in 
the restive southern provinces.  
6. Thesis Overview 
This thesis is organized into six sections: An introduction, four main chapters and 
a conclusion. In the introduction a quick overview of the region is provided, framing the 
                                                 
31 Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” The American Political 
Science Review, 65, no. 3 (1971): 685. 
32 Ibid., 688. 
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nature and magnitude of the problem, and then a more specific question is presented to 
the reader. Specifically, I will determine why the province of Satun has remained 
peaceful compared to the neighboring Muslim provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, Patani, and 
Songkhala, which have been wracked by assassinations, bombings, arson attacks, and 
other terrorist activities over the past several years. In addition, the introduction will be 
utilized to provide a brief overview of the main schools of thought for explaining conflict 
proposed in this thesis, specifically cultural, institutional, or rational choice models.  
Chapters II and III consist of historical narratives that will examine Satun and 
Patani’s evolution from roughly 700 CE to the current day. By exploring the divergent 
trajectories of these two regions using a historical comparison, we can clearly begin to 
see some of the similarities that exist between these two areas as well as their pronounced 
differences. This story of political development and power consolidation from a macro 
(national) and micro (regional) perspective will also help to illustrate that the periods of 
violence and peace in southern Thailand have often followed a sine wave pattern of 
elevated levels of violence during some periods and record lows in others. 
Chapters IV and V will explore the different additional influences for Satun’s 
quiescent nature and Patani’s persistent violence using the three types of explanations 
outlined in the introduction (cultural, institutional, and rational choice). Each of these 
categories are extremely broad in terms of the independent variables that could be 
discussed, so I have narrowed each category down to a few critical elements that are most 
pertinent to this discussion. In regards to culture, I investigate certain long-standing 
influences in both regions, such as language, and religion. Although the vast majority of 
explanations for the violence in southern Thailand are institutional in nature, it was 
important to narrow the field of these possible institutional factors down to some of the 
more frequently cited causes. Some of the more common explanations within this 
particular category have included education, center-periphery relations, political 
representation, and the use or actions of domestic security forces. Lastly, these chapters 
(IV and V) will also examine the potential impact of rational choice models for both of 
these provinces. For example, it appears that economic considerations may directly 
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contribute to Satun’s continued pursuit of peaceful coexistence with the Thai 
government. Additionally, anecdotal evidence suggests that in a cost-benefit analysis, the 
residents of Satun see no benefit in resorting to violence against the Thai government, 
even if it is framed in a “legitimate” mantle of jihad that is supposed to be in defense of 
fellow Muslims. In Patani, violence has been selected as a defensive measure to protect 
valuable cultural practices, but also as a means of projecting power and gaining attention 
to some of the grievances that are taking place within the region. 
In the conclusion, an analysis and summary of the comparisons between these two 
regions will be drawn in order to identify the reasons for the lack of violence in Satun.  
In an article written in 2008, Jack Levy discusses the capacities and liabilities of 
case studies much like the one proposed here.33 It is extremely challenging to address this 
specific topic with so many potential independent variables that could be taken into 
consideration. However, I believe that if we use the formation of an ethnic identity as our 
core independent variable, we can see how this particular element in both Satun and 
Patani has interacted with various institutions that followed it in order to cause several 
rational choice decisions to be made by the populations in each region. This particular 
arrangement of topics was chosen because it allows the thesis to approach this subject 
from two logical lines of analysis. First, it provides a standardized template of 
characteristics that can be used as a “yardstick” to compare the two different regions. 
Second, by conducting a side-by-side analysis, it allows us to contrast the differences 
between these two regions more dramatically.   
B. SATUN’S DEMOGRAPHICS AND HISTORY 
The southern province of Satun can be easily identified on a map of Thailand’s 
southern provinces (Figure 1) and it shares many inherent similarities to the other local 
provinces that surround it, such as Narathiwat, Patanni, Yala, and Songkhla.34 First and 
                                                 
33 Jack Levy, “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference,” Conflict Management and 
Peace Science, 25 (2008): 1–18. 
34 “International Crisis Group. “Thailand’s Emergency Decree: No Solution” Asia Report, no. 105, 
2005, Appendix B.  
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foremost, the populations of Satun, Narathiwat, Patanni, and Yala are all predominantly 
of the Muslim faith. In 1960, census data from these regions show that the estimated 
Muslim population in Satun is roughly 83 percent, Narathiwat, 78 percent, Patanni, 78 
percent, Yala 61 percent and Songkhla at approximately 19 percent.35 Although Songkhla 
has typically contained a lower number of Muslims than the other province, it still shares 
many close historical and commercial links to Satun, Narathiwat, Patanni, and Yala. 
Some forty years later, the 2000 national census showed that although Satun’s Muslim 
population had declined by roughly 15 percentage points (68 percent) all of the Muslim 
populations in the other provinces had risen slightly- Narathiwat had increased to 82 
percent, Patanni 81 percent, Yala 69 percent, and Songkhla at 23 percent.36 Despite the 
changes in these demographics, it is clear that the trend for many of Thailand’s Muslims 
to be concentrated in these regions continues into the 21st century. In a country where 94 
percent of the population practices the Buddhist faith and speaks Thai, the presence of 
large, consolidated pockets of Muslim communities within Thailand is an interesting 
divergence to explore, especially in regard to the potential for ethnic conflict.37  
Second, Satun has a shared history with its neighbors in that it was part of an 
autonomous region for several centuries prior coming under the direct control of the Thai 
government. In the case of the modern day provinces of Narathiwat, Patanni, Yala, and 
Songkhla, these areas were part of a powerful collective sultanate known as Patani, while 
Satun fell under a different independent Sultanate called Kedah during Thailand’s early 
historical annals from approximately 1136 to 1821 CE.38  
                                                 
35 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, “The Historical Development of Thai-Speaking Muslim Communities 
in Southern Thailand and Northern Malaysia.” In Civility and Savagery: Social Identity in Tai States, ed. 
Andrew Turton (Surrey UK: Curzon Press, 2000), 176. Although these statistics are somewhat dated (1960 
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continue to be, populated by a majority of the Muslims within the country. 
36 “Population & Housing Census,” National Statistical Office of Thailand, Economic and Social 
Statistics Bureau, 2000. http://web.nso.go.th/pop2000/pop_e2000.htm. 
37 “United Nations Thailand Country Monograph,” March 2012. 
http://www.un.or.th/thailand/population.html.  
38 All of the historical dates and time references in this thesis will be based on the “Current Era” or 
Christian calendar. The year 1136 is the frequently cited date when King Phra Ong Mahawangsa converted 
to Islam and established Kedah as a Muslim Sultanate.  
22 
 
Lastly, there is the impact of geography itself. This attribute is enduring and 
unchangeable in many regards and can have direct impacts on the sociological and 
political developments of various regions due to the effects geography can cause such as 
accessibility into the region, proximity to centers of power, and availability of resources. 
The location of Satun in relation to other countries and social groups, as well as the 
presence of natural barriers between Satun and external agencies, has also played a 
critical role in the absence of conflict in this region. A map of Thailand for example 
(Figure 2) shows the immense distance between Satun and Bangkok as well as the 
distinct separation between Satun and other MMP areas along the Thai-Malaysian 
border.39 In the case of Satun itself, the province is bounded by a ring of rough, 
mountainous terrain, and several observers have theorized that its geography has 
prevented the ease of movement between Malaysia and southern Thailand and reduced 
the number of cross-border linkages between Satun and Perlis.40 This natural barrier was 
also one of the reasons that the current border between Satun and Perlis exists as it does: 
Siamese and British cartographers and politicians used these formations as a convenient 
“marker” to identify the administrative limits between the two countries in 1909. Another 
critical aspect of Satun’s geography is the distance that exists between the province and 
centers of political power, such as Alor Setar or Bangkok. Especially before the advent of 
modern means of transportation and travel was strictly conducted by foot or animals, it 
often took several days or even weeks to make the journey between these locations. As a 
result, it was difficult for leaders in the Kedah Sultanate or the Siamese government to 
easily apply direct control to these subsidiary or peripheral areas. Contemporary access 
methods such as roadways or airports are a fairly recent development and to this day, the 
geography around Satun prevents a large majority of people from easily moving 
north/south via overland routes. A border crossing at Wang Prachan was constructed in 
1984, and prior to this development, the only other means for quickly moving between 
                                                 
39 Thailand Administrative Divisions,” January 10, 2012. World of Maps website, 
http://www.worldofmaps.net/uploads/pics/karte_thailand.jpg.  
40 Thomas I. Parks, “Maintaining Peace in a Neighbourhood Torn by Separatism: The Case of Satun 
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these two locations was by maritime vessels going to the ports of Tammalang or 
Chebilang. In addition to physical aspect of geographic barriers between Satun and other 
neighboring regions, there are also the administrative or political boundaries that isolate 
this region as well. For example, the province of Songkhla to the east and south of Satun 
effectively interposes a broad band of Thai Buddhist territory between Satun and 
Patani.41 One might think that this presence of Thai Buddhists would create conflict 
between Satun and Songkhla, but in reality, these two provinces have historically 
maintained congenial relations and conducted extensive commercial trade between them.  
 
Figure 1.   Five Southernmost Provinces of Thailand 
                                                 
41 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities Of The Southern 
Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 80. 
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Figure 2.   Administrative Provinces of Thailand. 
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It was only fairly recently, during 1909, that these Muslim-majority provinces 
(MMP) were permanently incorporated into Thailand as a whole. Some of these 
communities were able to undertake this transformation and assimilation process much 
more easily than others, but the question remains as to why some regions were able to 
conduct this process more easily. Lastly, as with other peripheral regions of Thailand, 
such as the north and the northeast, these southern MMPs had to contend with the 
imposition of national political and social institutions that were aggressively promoted by 
the Thai government. In an attempt to create a unified nationalistic identity throughout 
the southern regions, and indeed throughout Thailand itself, Thai leaders relied on 
enforcing mandated standards for what it meant to be “Thai” via the practice of various 
social behaviors, such as language, religion, and education. Unfortunately, this aspect of 
ethnic assimilation by the central government also contained the potential seeds of 
conflict and rebellion.  
Recently, the Thai government has implemented cordon and search operations 
since 2007 in an attempt to control the violence in the south and although these measures 
have reduced the overall numbers of insurgent attacks, the incidents that did occur were 
marked by much higher levels of brutality (such as beheadings or burnings) and the use 
of more powerful vehicular borne explosive devices within densely populated urban 
targets.42 This well-documented chaos and violence in the Patani region makes Satun an 
intriguing province to study because Satun has not suffered from the same waves of 
insurgency and terrorism that has plagued Narathiwat, Patanni, Yala, and Songkhla. This 
is not due to a lack of effort on the part of Islamic extremists in the region. On many 
different occasions and in a number of documents, Satun has been included in the Patani 
rubric of Islamic autonomy and independence, despite the fact that it was never 
historically a part of these neighboring provinces. For example, the GAMPAR 
(Gabungan Melayu Pattani Raya, or “The Association of Malays of Greater Pattani”) 
manifesto of 1948 published a letter of intent that stated a desire to: 
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… unite the four provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun as a 
Malay Islamic state and liberate its residents from oppression and 
exploitation; establish a state appropriate to Islamic traditions and 
practices to meet the demands of the Malay-Muslims; and to improve the 
status and quality of life of the Malay-Muslims in the areas of humanity, 
justice, freedom and education without delay.43  
These types of sentiments were mirrored in later years by other more militant 
when groups such as the Patani United Liberation Organization (or PULO, which was 
established in 1968) declared that: 
… the secession of the majority Malay-Muslim regions of southern 
Thailand, and the establishment of an independent Malay-Muslim state in 
their place. This state would be comprised of the provinces of Pattani, 
Narathiwat, Yala, and Satun, along with several majority Malay-Muslim 
districts of adjacent Songkhla province.44 
In addition to published and public statements, there have been several reports 
that insurgent groups have attempted to establish themselves in Satun in order to recruit 
the province’s Muslim population into the larger struggle against the Thai government in 
Narathiwat, Patanni, Yala, and Songkhla. Interestingly, these attempts at recruitment and 
expanding the scope of rebellion into Satun were consistently rebuffed and quickly 
reported to Satun’s provincial authorities by local citizens. Because of this active 
“neighborhood watch”  activity in Satun, the local police were able to return these 
insurgent emissaries back to the “deep south” and quickly dampen insurgent efforts  
before they became problematic.45 This particular interaction is just one of several 
reasons why violence and rebellion have not had the ability to gain a foothold in Satun.  
What other factors have contributed to this divergent outcome to take place in 
Satun? There are three main schools of thought for explaining the absence of ethnic or 
                                                 
43 International Crisis Group. “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,” Asia Report, no. 98, 2005, 
6.  
44 “Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism,” February 17, 2012, 
http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-World-Insurgency-and-Terrorism/Patani-United-Liberation-
Organisation-PULO-Thailand.html. 
45 Anthony Davis, “Satun Escapes The Grip of Thai Violence That is Blighting South,” Jane’s 
Intelligence Review (2005): 4. 
27 
 
religious violence in this particular region. The first possible explanation that some 
researchers advocate is that cultural factors, such as history, language, and religious 
practices have been instrumental in shaping the consistent trends of nonviolence that are 
found in Satun. The second explanation is that structural or institutional influences are the 
cause of this phenomenon, especially with respect to various grievances local populations 
have suffered at the hands of the Thai government. The third explanation for the lack of 
violence in Satun is that rational choice factors are at work in this situation. The vast 
majority of the population in Satun has decided that there is little benefit to engage in 
violence against the government because of the negative results such a course of action 
would create. In particular, the use of violence would result in increased numbers of 
government troops and national police being brought into Satun, and the repressive 
security measures that would be used to restore order would undoubtedly cause immense 
suffering in the area. This is a specific outcome and condition that the inhabitants of 
Satun have chosen to avoid. 
This thesis posits that the current nonviolent conditions in Satun have been shaped 
by its unique history and cooperative relationship with the Thai government. In 
particular, the ethnic identity of the region has proven to be much more malleable and 
adaptive than the Patani provinces. This flexibility has subsequently encouraged a more 
peaceful response to the Thai government’s nationalist agenda that was strictly enforced 
within the country from 1909 to 1945 and has been present within the country to varying 
degrees ever since the early 20th century.46 This foundation of Satun’s ethnic identity has 
subsequently been strongly reinforced by institutional factors implemented by the Thai 
government such as public education and the use of Thai as a national language. Because 
of these cultural and institutional influences, the subsequent decision to employ violence 
either in Satun or in assisting Satun’s neighboring provinces of Narathiwat, Patanni, 
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Yala, and Songkhla to conduct insurgent operations against the government was 
seemingly an easy one to make on the part of Satun’s Muslim population: it just simply 
was not worth it. 
1. Satun’s Historical Record 
Although it can be argued that a wide variety of factors can contribute to the 
formation of a cultural identity, in the scope of this paper, I will focus on three main 
independent variables: history, language, and religion. These three particular components 
all represent parts of a strong evolutionary influence that has created a much different 
ethnic or cultural identity to develop in Satun than what we find in other MMPs within 
Thailand. As a result, violence and insurgency have not been able to find a suitable 
environment to easily take root in this region.  
a. Early Satun History Prior to 1200 CE  
The modern day province of Satun has an extensive documented history 
that stretches back for over 2,000 years. The course of this narrative is critical to 
illustrating how different Satun’s cultural identity is from Narathiwat, Patanni, Yala, or 
Songkhla. Before Satun existed as either a district of the Malay state of Kedah, or as a 
province of Thailand, it was actually a part of a Hindu kingdom founded by Maharaja 
Derbar Raja of Gemeron around the 7th century CE. The Maharaja Derbar Raja, who was 
also known by the name Bandar Abbas, was a Persian ruler who fled his homeland after 
being defeated in battle. During his journey, he was blown off course by a storm and 
landed in the southern Isthmus of Thailand in the vicinity of Kedah’s modern day capital 
of Alor Setar.47 The local population of Malay Hindus is believed to have found Bandar 
Abbas to be an intelligent and honorable leader and he was soon appointed as the Rajah  
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of the Hindu-Malay kingdom of Kedah. This represents one of the oldest Hindu-Malay 
kingdoms recorded on the Thai-Malaysian peninsula along with the kingdom of 
Langkasuka that preceded it.   
Four centuries later, the 9th Hindu Rajah of Kedah (Dubar Rajah II) or 
“Phra Ong  Mahawangsa” as he was known by the Siamese, converted to Islam after this 
religion was introduced to the area by Muslim traders and converts from today’s modern 
state of Aceh.48 Phra Ong Mahawangsa ruled the sultanate of Kedah in what is now 
southern Thailand and the northern sector of the Malay peninsula from roughly 1136 to 
1179. Satun, which was referred to as “Mambang Segara,” or “Mukin Setul” in the Malay 
language, existed under this umbrella of control for many years; however, it was on the 
northernmost periphery of the Kedah sultante and was often removed from the center of 
politics and power maintained by Kedah in the capital of Alor Setar. This factor of 
distance and center-periphery relationships would play heavily in the formation of 
Satun’s cultural identity in the years to follow. The relationship between Satun and 
Kedah was amicably maintained for several centuries, although in 1238 Kedah and its 
subsidiaries began to have more interaction with the Siamese empires to the north, such 
as the Sukothai and Ayutthaya dynasties that were expanding and gaining power within 
the region. 
b. The Ayutthaya Dynasty, 1351–1767 
Although the fairly short lived Sukhothai Empire (1238–1448) is often 
cited as the starting point for Muslim interactions in Siamese and Thai politics, it was not 
until the Ayutthaya Dynasty that Muslims, along with many other ethnic and religious 
groups, began to rise to positions of power and prestige within Siam due to the inclusive 
and cosmopolitan nature of this kingdom.49 One reason for this trend was the growth of 
regional trading centers, such as Java, Sumatra, Malacca, the western coast of Thailand 
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(e.g., Satun), and Burma, all of which had important roles as shipping entrepots; trading 
posts for materials, such as tin, teak, spices, silk, or precious metals; and waypoints for 
maritime traffic heading west to India or east toward China.50 This interaction also 
corresponded with the spread of Islam through the Malay Archipelago and the presence 
of many different cultures that actively participated within the Ayutthaya court, such as 
Indians, Persians, Portuguese, Chinese, and Malays. For example, one Muslim of west 
Asian origin served under King Prasat Thong from 1629 to 1656 as a royal advisor and 
minister in charge of foreign trade, import-export duties, and international shipping.51  
As Thanat Aphornsuvan points out in an article from 2003, the Muslims 
who enjoyed these relationships within the Ayutthaya court were frequently Shiite 
Muslims from Arab and Persian backgrounds who were able to easily assimilate into the 
noble classes of the Siamese monarchs through intermarriage and political service. This 
lay in stark contrast to the Muslims of the Satun and Patani regions who adhered to the 
Sunni lineage of religious beliefs and frequently pursued their livelihoods in agriculture, 
a difference that stratified and differentiated the patterns of Islamization within Thailand 
during this period.52 Specifically, the professions or trades that these groups performed in 
the society also determined the level of access they would have to political power and 
involvement in the royal court. Another aspect of Ayutthaya’s relatively benign 
relationship with the southern Malay regions was the tradition of the Bunga Mas Dan 
Perak, which began approximately in the 14th century. The Bunga Mas or “golden and 
silver flowers” consisted of various expensive gifts sent to the Siamese kings: several 
small trees made of precious metals, as well as four spears with gilded shafts, a kris 
encrusted with gems, a spittoon, a box, an arrangement of betel leaves, and two rings. 
These gifts were a regular tribute sent every three years to the King of Siam from vassal 
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states in the Malay peninsula, specifically Kedah, Pattani, Kelantin, and Terengganu. In 
return, the King of Siam sent the southern sultanates gifts of equal value to reciprocate. 
From the perspective of the southern Malays, this practice was conducted as a symbol of 
friendship. For the Siamese, bunga mas was seen as an indicator of their suzerainty over 
their distant territories. Although these groups interpreted this relationship slightly 
differently, all of these political conditions under the Ayutthaya leadership represented a 
trend toward indirect control, multi-culturalism, and benign relations that allowed local 
regions like Satun to have a great deal of local autonomy and freedom. Due to the 
growing pressure of several different internal and external influences within Southeast 
Asia, however, this relationship was about to shift dramatically.  
c. The Chakri Dynasty and the Bangkok Period, 1767–1902  
As the Ayutthaya Kingdom went into decline and defeat at the hands of 
the Burmese, it was replaced by the Chakri Dynasty, which had different priorities and 
ways of handling domestic politics than its predecessors. One of the immediate concerns 
of the Chakri leaders was protecting Thai territory against the pressures of territorial 
encroachment from local Southeast Asian competitors, such as Burma, Cambodia, or 
Laos, as well as defending against larger threats posed by expanding imperial power,s 
such as the British and French. Siam began to use various elements of national power, 
specifically diplomacy and the military, to achieve its goals, which centered on a 
consolidation of territorial control and survival. Siamese leaders also decided to pursue a 
strategy of political assimilation throughout the country using physical force and direct 
intervention in many of the Malay states and surrounding territories.53  
Although Satun remained under the political control of Kedah for many 
years and had been granted a great deal of autonomy during the Ayutthaya Era by leaders 
in both the Kedah sultanate and the Siamese government, this soon began to change. In 
1813, Satun fell under the administration of Siamese governors sent from Nakhon Si 
Thammarat, which helped to extend the control from the center of the Siamese 
                                                 




government to the edges of the country by sending “trusted agents” to oversee local 
affairs. Even worse, in 1821, Siamese forces launched a coordinated attack against the 
sultanate of Kedah, moving ground forces overland from the north and east and also 
bringing several heavily armed ships into the Kedah port of Kuala Kedah. 54 This sudden 
aggression forced Kedah’s sultan Ahmad Taju’ddin to flee to Penang, but in an 
interesting turn of events, this military attack did not bring about the control of the region 
that King Rama III had originally hoped. Instead, thousands of citizens fled Kedah for the 
safety of Penang in the wake of the Siamese invasion, prompting Rama III to declare: 
In the case of Kedah, three-quarters of the inhabitants have gone over into 
British territory and we have only been able to hold on to a quarter of the 
population. And a lot of these have been brought up here as captives, so 
there aren’t many left…If we abandoned Kedah, we would be losing a 
considerable source of revenue and the British would pick it up and annex 
it; we cannot treat the matter lightly.55 
Although the Siamese government had expelled the leaders of Kedah via military force, 
Rama III was forced to actually reinstate them in 1842 in order to bring the local 
populations back into the area and re-stabilize the region.56  
The situation in Satun was quite similar to what was seen in Kedah. 
Although Siam had gained direct military control of the province, several of the Muslim 
leaders in Satun were left in place to continue running local government organizations. 
Many observers have commented on the paradox that took place within Satun during this 
time period in that here was a region in which the Siamese government allowed local 
leaders to ultimately remain in place and it actually had far less future outbreaks of 
violence and rebellion when compared to the more rebellious Patani region where local 
populations were forced to assimilate to new policies and ousted leaders were not 
permitted to return to the area.57  
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Following the Siamese attacks on Kedah and its assimilation into the 
Chakri territories during 1821, King Rama III soon signed the Burney Accord (also 
known as the Treaty of Amity and Commerce) with Britain in 1826. This document 
stated that Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Terengganu would remain exclusively Thai 
provinces while Penang and Province Wellesley would belong to the British. In addition, 
Thailand agreed not to interfere with British trade being conducted in Kelantan and 
Terengganu. This trend toward Siamese militarism and expansion was directed against 
many regional neighbors, not just the southern Malay states. In 1827, the Lao capital of 
Vientiane was sacked and the Laotian King Chao Anouvong found himself imprisoned in 
an iron cage in the Siamese capital. The Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh was also 
burned to the ground and a Chakri proxy was installed to do the bidding of the Siamese 
leadership. Forced population movements were instituted and massive numbers of people 
were essentially kidnapped from Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and the southern Malay 
regions in order to repopulate areas of Siam that had been decimated during the wars with 
Burma. In 1833, King Rama III dispatched a Siamese army from Bangkok into western 
Cambodia telling them to: 
… turn Cambodia into a forest, only the land, the mountains, the rivers, 
and the canals are to be left. You are to carry off the Khmer families to be 
resettled in Thai territory, do not leave any behind. It would be good to 
treat Cambodia as we did Vientiane.58 
King Chulalongkorn, also known as King Rama V, ruled Siam from 
1868–1910 and is one of the most widely respected monarchs and civic reformers in the 
country’s history. He is not only credited with developing a wide range of national 
management mechanisms that took Thailand down a path of modernization, but his 
reforms frequently were also designed to allow the center of Bangkok to extend political 
and social control out to the peripheries of the country. Chulalongkorn adopted many of 
these policies after studying western methods of governance that included the Napoleonic 
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code and British colonial districts he observed in India.59 Some of the initiatives 
Chulalongkorn implemented included fairly progressive ideas for the time such as the 
abolition of gambling, the corvee, and slavery. He also instituted a reform of the courts, 
created salaried bureaucracies, organized standing police forces and army units, and 
improved upon the country’s agriculture and educational capabilities.  
This movement to create a more powerful national government was 
extended again in 1897 via the Local Administration Act when King Chulalongkorn’s 
half-brother, Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, established the thesaphiban or “control over 
territory” system. The thesaphiban model organized the country into subdivisions known 
as monthons, as well as provinces (changwat), districts (amphoe), and communes 
(tambon).60 This particular event caused Satun to officially become incorporated as part 
of the Monthon Saiburi (Southern Division) and marked another turning point in which 
Satun and the Kedah sultante was increasingly absorbed into the growing national control 
being established by the Siamese government. Lastly, Chulalongkorn also began to 
reinforce the inculcation of certain values and beliefs throughout Siam, specifically the 
promotion of concepts such as chart (the nation), satsana (religion), and phra mahakasat 
(the monarchy), which were designed to unify the diverse ethnic population within Siam 
into a single ethnic identity. 61 These three concepts would prove to be cornerstones of the 
future development of nationalism and “Thaification” that would dominate the country 
and its inhabitants in the 20th century and also prove to be the genesis for increasing 
amounts of conflict and violence.  
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d. Nationalism and the Modern Era 1902–Present  
In 1902, the Siamese government took additional steps to increase its 
control of the southern regions. One of the methods that King Chulalongkorn used to do 
this was to formally incorporate the Patani region into Siam and divide this area into 
three separate provinces, namely Patanni, Narathiwat, and Yala.62 The Siamese 
government replaced the local leadership in Patani and replaced them with officials from 
Bangkok who only spoke Thai and reported directly to the government leaders in the 
capital. This same sort of consolidation and control was instituted in religion and the 
monarchy as well. The Sangha Act of 1902, for example, organized the Buddhist 
underpinnings of the government by structuring all of the Wat (temples) and monks in the 
country in a hierarchal chain all the way from the king and the supreme patriarch down to 
individual monks throughout Siam, which reinforced the linkage between the government 
and Buddhism as the dominant religion within the country. The monarchy was designated 
as an all-powerful “brain” that was charged with making decisions for the good of the 
country, as Chulalongkorn described it: 
The king rules absolutely at his own royal desire. There is nothing greater 
than this. The king has absolute power as 1) ruler over the realm and 
refuge for the people; 2) the source of justice; 3) the source of rank and 
status; 4) commander of the armed forces who relieves the people’s 
suffering by waging war or conducting friendly relations with other 
countries. The king does no wrong. There is no power that can judge or 
punish him.63 
Due to increasing conflicts with Britain over the border demarcation 
between southern Siam and northern Malaysia, the Siamese government made an 
arrangement with the United Kingdom to split the Monthon Saiburi, to include Satun, 
between the two states as part of the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909. In this particular 
arrangement, Siam returned the areas of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantin, and Trengganu to 
Britain and in return Siam gained control of the Patani region of Narathiwat, Patanni, 
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Yala, and Songkhla. While most of Kedah was ceded to Britain, Satun was awarded to 
Siam because the vast majority of its population was identified as being Siamese and 
having widely practiced socio-cultural traits that tied the province more closely to the 
capital located in Bangkok than Kedah’s center of power in Alor Setar. During this 
period of upheaval and change, Satun was still able to keep a degree of local autonomy  
that was not seen or practiced in the Patani region, a factor that helped to largely reduce 
grievances and the potential for rebellion to occur in Satun during the years following 
1909.  
Nineteen hundred and thirty-two marked a dramatic change for the entire 
country and Siamese government when a bloodless coup initiated by the Khana Ratsadon 
(People’s Party) under the leadership of Pridi Banomyong succeeded in converting Siam 
into a constitutional monarchy. As a result of this revolution, King Prajadhipok (Rama 
VII) was forced into allowing the Siamese people to implement a new national 
constitution, which effectively ended centuries of rule by an absolute monarchy. The 
monthon system was abolished in 1933, and Satun province became a first-level 
subdivision of Thailand at the end of that year. A similar reorganization was conducted 
with the Patani region, resulting in the provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun 
being established with the territorial boundaries that they still have today.64 Although 
these developments would seem to indicate an evolutionary movement toward a nation 
that would allow greater political participation and social multiculturalism, Siam in fact 
drifted toward “ultranationalist” right wing policies under the leadership of Phibun 
Songkhram from 1938 to 1944.  
The policies implemented during Phibun’s control of the country were 
even more restrictive than anything that had been organized or executed previously under 
the Chakri Dynasty. Phibun’s cultural mandates, called the Ratthaniyom, tried to 
eliminate long standing ethnic differences within the country in order to standardize and 
reinforce what it meant to be “Thai.” The Ratthaniyom effectively banned the Malay 
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language from being used in government offices, required Muslims to have Thai names if 
they wanted to seek government employment, prohibited traditional Muslim attire from 
being worn in public, and attempted to enforce nationalist curriculum within Thai 
schools.65 Phibun also officially renamed the country from “Siam” to “Thailand” (“land 
of the Thais”) which represented yet another attempt to move away from a multi-cultural 
Siamese identity that had previously existed throughout the country to a new and more 
homogenized Thai identity.  
These policies were inflammatory for some of Thailand’s Muslim 
populations, and it appeared to many of these minority groups throughout the country that 
they were increasingly faced with two options: either submit to the central government’s 
directives by forsaking their language, culture, and religion or attempt to resist these 
pressures. Ergo, these series of events represented a major turning point in the country. 
Historically, this is where we see increasing levels of Islamic separatism, resistance 
groups, and independence movements began to develop and garner a large amount of 
local support in the Patani region. Satun, however, had cultivated an amicable 
relationship with Bangkok in many regards over the years and did not have the same 
reactions to these developments that Patani did. Although there was a slight degree of 
nonviolent protest in Satun during 1921 due to the Siamese government’s introduction of 
the Compulsory Primary Education Act, the local leaders of the province were able to 
resolve this disagreement with leaders in Bangkok without resorting to violence. In many 
respects, most Thai citizens in Satun viewed the measures that were implemented within 
their province by the Thai government as a mark of progress and welcomed them 
accordingly.  
Another important development in the late 1940s was the emergence of 
various organizations that pursued agendas centered on the mobilization of the Patani 
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population for political representation and cultural recognition. One such group was the 
Patanni People’s Movement (PPM), which was founded by Haji Sulong in 1947. The 
PPM provided a vehicle in which like-minded individuals could begin to engage in 
dialogue with the Thai government and attempt to gain concessions that would protect 
the unique cultural qualities of the Patani Muslims. Another similar organization was the 
Gabungam Melayu Pattani Raya (“Greater Pattani Malayu Association” or GAMPAR), 
which first organized in Malaya and then began to spread its influence and social contacts 
across the border to Patani. PPM and GAMPAR represented a changing dynamic in 
Thailand’s political landscape during the late 1940s and early 1950s where large scale 
social mobilization would become increasingly common to get both national and 
international visibility on grievance issues and provide a degree of collective bargaining 
power against the Thai government. Interestingly, there was a pronounced dearth of such 
groups developing in Satun due to the fact that the region had already managed to gain a 
certain degree of political representation as early as 1900 and this was a trend that 
continued for several decades afterward. One example of this increased amount of 
political engagement in Satun can be noted by the election results of 1946 in which Satun 
was the only MMP in the south to elect a Muslim representative, Jae Abdulla Langputeh, 
to the Thai parliament.66 
Despite the increasing mobilization of several segments of Thailand’s 
Muslim populations, many of the unicultural mindsets about authoritarian styles of 
governance and national identity that were developed within the country during the 1940s 
continued unabated during the 1950s. One aspect of this continuation was the fact that 
Phibun, and his law enforcement cohorts in the Royal Thai Police (RTP), such as Phao 
Siyanon, maintained a solid grip on power until 1957 when Phibun was removed from 
power in a coup initiated by Sarit Thanarat who largely controlled the Royal Thai Army 
(RTA).67 After Phibun’s removal, Sarit (who had appointed himself as the prime 
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minister, supreme commander, head of the army, director of the police, and minister of 
development), was increasingly concerned with the rising threat of communism and 
Chinese nationalism in surrounding countries as well as within Thailand itself. The 
United States, which had emerged as a new patron and ally of Thailand in the developing 
cold war, also helped reinforce this course of action in order to maintain a strong security 
posture within Thailand and cultivate a relationship between the two nations which could 
prove useful in future regional conflicts. As a result, the impetus for maintaining a rigid 
homogenous society and collective national identity that emerged during Phibun’s years 
in power was maintained to a large degree due to concerns about maintaining the stability 
of the national security environment in the face of both internal and external perceived 
threats.  
During the 1960s and 1970s, the situation became much more convoluted 
within Thailand, as there was a veritable explosion of new political and religious groups 
that began to demand a wide range of concessions from the Thai government. The 
Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) was just one of these emerging internal threats that 
had expanded its political agenda within the country and soon formed military units, such 
as the People’s Liberation Army of Thailand (PLAT), to assist in achieving their goals. 
The CPT and PLAT began to initiate a low intensity conflict against the Thai government 
by 1965 and based this offensive along the rural peripheries of the country with the 
majority of these skirmishes occurring along the Thai borders with Malaysia, Laos, 
Cambodia and Burma.  
In a similar fashion, this period also saw numerous Islamic separatist and 
nationalist groups begin to develop inside Thailand as well. Although early Patani social 
activist organizations such as the PPM and GAMPAR had essentially disintegrated in the 
early 1950s, they were the small seeds from which these new elements emerged. These 
new groups demonstrated more militant overtones and were increasingly prepared to 
organize armed resistance against the Thai government in order to achieve their goals. 
Some of these emerging actors included groups, such as the National Patani Liberation 
Front (BNPP, est. 1959), National Revolutionary Front (“Barisan Revolusi Nasional” or 
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BRN, est. 1960), and the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO, est. 1968).68 
Despite the differences in ideologies and strategies that these groups maintained, they all 
began to aggressively organize themselves to conduct military operations against the Thai 
government and it became evident that the issue of governance and Muslim grievances in 
Patani was not going to simply go away. Although Sarit died in 1963, his successors, 
Thanom Kittikhachon and Praphat Charusathian, continued their efforts to combat these 
Patani separatist groups as one would in a military campaign, by using soldiers, guns, and 
copious amounts of force.  
In addition to the increasing activism of political, ethnic, and religious 
organizations, additional pressure began to be applied to the Thai government from 
various student groups as well. Universities are always hotbeds of new ideas, social 
debate, and the energy of young reformers who would like to change the status quo. 
Accordingly, many Patani Muslims began to align themselves with various pro-
democracy student movements that were increasingly frustrated with the fact that 
increased access to educational opportunities apparently did not always equate to 
increased political representation or social power. This cauldron of discontent boiled over 
in 1976 when elements of the RTA and RTP (in particular the Red Guar, Border Patrol 
Police and Village Scouts) violently suppressed students at Thammasat University, 
killing 43 people and arresting over 8,000 more.69  
In the midst of this social and political turmoil, General Prem 
Tinsulanond, a former Thai military officer from Songkhla province, took office as the 
Prime Minister in 1980. He soon engaged in sweeping reforms that emphasized 
persuasive policies of integration rather than assimilation or suppression. Prem began to 
develop innovative new institutions to deal with the problem in the south, as well as 
attempting to encourage public participation in the political process to address some of 
the social turmoil that had occurred within the country during the 1970s. He also 
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supported economic development throughout Thailand and offered amnesty to many 
insurgent and separatist leaders. By incentivizing activity such as surrendering to local 
authorities or renouncing the use of violence, PM Prem was able to garner a great deal of 
participation in these pacification efforts from both local communities as well as 
opposition or insurgent groups. Prem’s initiatives also marked a substantial movement 
away from previous government mandates of unwavering nationalism, patriotism, and 
unicultural state-building to a more moderate form of socio-cultural pluralism and 
developing ties between Thailand and its citizens as a “whole” polity. These measures 
were quite effective, and under his leadership the conflict between Patani and Bangkok 
was dramatically reduced. 
The democratic and institutional reforms instituted by Prem and the 
leaders who followed him during the 1980s and 1990s were soon completely reversed 
following the election of a controversial new Prime Minister named Thaksin Shinawatra 
in 2001.70 Thaksin Shinawatra served as the appointed Prime Minister (PM) of Thailand 
from 2001 to 2006. Running on a populist platform, Thaksin declared himself “a man of 
the people” and promised to provide a national healthcare plan, debt assistance for 
farmers, and extensive development funds for rural areas.71 Although his words sounded 
promising, his actions were controversial and considered by some to be very detrimental 
to the country as a whole, particularly to the Patani Muslims. In particular, there was an 
immense surge in the levels of violence and insurgent activity in southern Thailand over 
the course of the five years Thaksin was in office. Although levels of violence have 
dropped somewhat since Thaksin’s ouster in 2006, the damage he inflicted on Bangkok-
Patani relations was substantial and enduring. He misjudged the nature of the people and 
problems within Thailand, failed to support effective provincial institutions and 
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governance, and ultimately implemented abusive and deadly domestic policies that only 
reignited and inflamed the problems of violent conflict.  
Despite this roller coaster of social and political development within 
Thailand during the latter half of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century, 
the story of Satun during these sixty years is essentially a nonstarter: Its Muslim 
inhabitants maintained a generally peaceful and quiet environment throughout the 
province by promoting congenial relations with both the Thai government and other local 
Thai and Chinese ethnic groups.  
In short, Satun’s history is rife with multi-cultural influences and dramatic 
political and economic changes at both a regional and national level.72 Alongside these 
developments, Satun was historically on the outer edges of government control, not only 
when it fell under the auspices of the Kedah sultanate, but also much later when it was 
politically assimilated by the Thai government in 1909. This regular turnover in regimes, 
governments, nationalisms, and, administrative institutions challenged the inhabitants of 
Satun to define not only how they saw themselves, but also how they would view their 
relationship with the central government. In large part, there was a consistent trend of 
flexibility and acceptance on the part of Satun when major changes occurred. The sense 
of outrage and loss when regional autonomy was threatened did not resonate in Satun like 
it did in Patani. This less contentious dynamic allowed Satun to assimilate into the larger 
Thai national narrative with a minimum of resistance and violence, a fact that was 
radically different from what took place in Patani. The historic foundations for building 
ethnic identities and center-periphery relationships in Satun and Patani would prove to be 
critical in determining how the Thai government and these Muslim minority groups 
would interact in the years to come.  
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C. PATANI’S DEMOGRAPHICS AND HISTORY  
The southern provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani, and Songkhla have many 
demographic similarities to Satun. First, there is the aspect of their predominant religious 
characteristics. Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani are all populated by a Muslim majority which 
maintains many social and linguistic similarities to Malay Muslims who are located in the 
Malaysian state of Kelantan. Songkhla also has a large number of Muslims living within 
the province (23 percent as of the year 2000) and although this population is much lower 
than what is found in Yala, Narathiwat, or Pattani, it is still much higher than the Muslim 
concentrations found in other regions of the country. Bangkok, for example, is roughly 4 
percent Muslim and many provinces within the northeast region of Isaan, such as Nakhon 
Ratchasima or Chaiyaphum, have a Muslim population of less than 0.1 percent.73  
Another close similarity between Satun and Patani can be found within their 
economic sectors. Southern Thailand relies heavily on agricultural production and  
natural resource commodities such as rubber, timber, and fisheries, however this type of 
livelihood does not have the same sort of economic returns associated with it that 
manufacturing or trade does. A good example of this divergence in provincial economies 
can be demonstrated by Songkhla, which has developed into a robust commercial and 
industrial center. Songkhla boasts a Gross Provincial Product (GPP) that is roughly four 
times as high as its southern neighbors and an average per capita income that is two times 
higher than Yala, Narathiwat, or Pattani.74 Although it appears that this aspect of 
economic inequality and poverty could be a possible contributing factor for the violence 
in Patani, some researchers have pointed out that the GPP and average per capita incomes 
in Yala, Narathiwat, or Pattani have actually risen substantially from 1983 to 2003.75 
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Much like Satun, geography has also played a role in how Patani has been able to 
effectively align itself with other national actors and influenced the trajectory of violence 
within the region. In Satun, this geographic influence was seen as a condition of relative 
inaccessibility and separation which contributed to an endstate of isolation and 
tranquility. In the Patani region, its close proximity to several politically active regions of 
Malaysia combined with a flat, porous border has contributed to a much different 
outcome. Instead of reinforcing a sense of peace, Patani’s geography has actually helped 
fuel political mobilization and sheltered insurgents who might plan or conduct attacks 
and then use the border as a convenient escape route. The relative proximity to the center 
of power is another influence as well: All of these particular Muslim areas are on the 
southernmost tip of the country and in this respect are extremely far away from the locus 
of the capital region. Almost as important as the distance from Bangkok, is the short 
distance between Patani and neighboring Islamic states in Malyasia such as Kelantan. 
Patani and Kelantan both share a very porous border area and this has allowed many 
trans-national relationships and ties to develop in terms of families, businesses, 
employment, and trade moving between them.   
Border areas frequently prove to be problematic for national governments to 
manage and this region of southern Thailand has experienced a similar phenomenon. One 
example of the efforts that the national leaders of Thailand and Malaysia implemented to 
police this area is demonstrated by their extensive cooperation during the 1960s and 
1970s in order to control the cross-border movement of Communist insurgents from the 
Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and the Communist Party of Malaysia (CPM) who 
used this “grey area” between the two nations to plan future operations and find refuge 
from Thai government counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. There have also been 
similar initiatives for Thai-Malaysian government cooperation in more recent years to 
reduce smuggling and the movement of Islamic insurgents across the border as well.   
This issue is extremely sensitive for the Malaysian government however as many 
Malaysians, especially the communities living in Kelantan, feel that the Thai government 
has been extremely abusive and heavy handed with the Patani Muslims who live to the 
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north of the border. This particular aspect of the Thai-Malaysian border also underscores 
the long-standing familial and political ties Patani has maintained with the neighboring 
Malysian state of Kelantan. Kelantan was the same area where Tengu Abdul Kadir took 
refuge after he was forced out of Patani by the Siamese authorities in 1915. 
1. Patani’s Historical Record 
On 31 March 2012, a series of vehicle borne improvised explosive devices 
(VBIEDs) were detonated in the cities of Yala (Yala province), Hat Yai (Songkhla 
Province), and Mae Lan (Pattani province). Local authorities from these regions 
commented on the cold and calculated characteristics of these attacks due to the presence 
of large numbers of civilians in the vicinity when the bombs exploded and the fact that 
several of these cities are prominent hubs of tourism and commerce in southern 
Thailand.76 Many analysts have described these particular attacks as some of the most 
destructive terrorist events the region has experienced in recent years, but they are by no 
means isolated incidents. As Anthony Davis and John Cole noted in a recent article for 
Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Monitor, the violence in southern Thailand has been a 
long-standing problem within the country for many years and it demonstrates a number 
of puzzling qualities that researchers and government officers alike are still trying to 
decipher.77  
The opaque nature of this problem makes it difficult to determine certain facts, 
such as why this violence has been confined strictly to the southern provinces and who 
the primary actors are that frequently decide to execute these attacks. Davis and Cole 
have described this particular situation in the southern provinces as one of three 
substantial “…domestic security threats…” that threatens to seriously undermine the 
stability and authority of the Thai government on a national level. Furthermore, these 
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authors attribute these attacks to the actions and ideals of “Malay-Muslim separatists 
committed to the creation of an independent state of Pattani.” 
So how did these Muslim separatist movements come to exist in southern 
Thailand? Why have their members framed their relationship with the Thai government 
so differently than the Muslims in Satun? What do they hope to accomplish by creating 
an “independent state of Pattani?” And what are the evolutionary developments that have 
prompted Muslims in Narathiwat, Yala, Pattani, or Songkhla to lobby for political 
autonomy and the formation of a separate Islamic state? I believe that in order for us to 
better understand the influences that are driving this conflict and answer these three 
particular questions, we must examine the pathways of Thailand’s development over 
several centuries and see how the roots of this conflict have been shaped from an ethnic, 
historical, and political perspective. By closely examining the conditions in the Patani 
area through these particular lenses, we can see that this violence is the direct result of 
several cultural, institutional, and rational choice paradigms that exist within both 
southern Thailand and the country as a whole. 
The creation of a coherent cultural identity often develops as a confluence of 
different factors, such as history, language, or religion. For example, the development of 
nationalism as a type of cultural self-reference is frequently cited as a process in which 
these types of beliefs are cultivated and promulgated by referencing or creating shared 
experiences. In this regard, history, language, and religion can be leveraged to define a 
group as a unified political whole and reinforce concepts about who actually “belongs” 
within the community and “others” who are viewed as outsiders or strangers. Although 
there is not an exact or hard science about how and when this process of “identity 
building” ultimately takes place in various countries around the world, many experts 
agree that “…Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it 
invents nations where they do not exist.”78 The same thing could be said for ethnic 
identities as well, in that these types of identifications are often created by groups of 
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people in order to bind them together, and the various underlying commonalities that 
groups of people share are helpful in achieving this goal. For example, as Benedict 
Anderson points out in his book Imagined Communities, different types of religious 
communities, such as the Christians, Buddhists, or Muslims, have been able to forge this 
type of  shared identity through the use of a “sacred language and written script,” despite 
being widely separated in a geographic sense.79  
Taking this concept one step further, Anderson points out that if we examine the 
Islamic Ummah (“community” or “nation”), in which a massive network of disparate 
Muslim groups exists and can be characterized as stretching all the way from the Sulu 
Archipelago to Morocco, it is possible to see how this concept of shared traits binds them 
together: Even if two dissimilar individuals from this Ummah (such as a Malaysian 
Muslim from the state of Kelantan and a Uyghur Muslim from Xinjiang, China) were to 
meet in London, despite the immense gulf between their spoken languages, geographic 
origins, or regional cultures, they theoretically would still be able to communicate and 
appreciate one another through shared symbols or the common bonds they had 
developed, such as the possession of a Koran or possibly an understanding of written 
Arabic. This same type of identity evolution has occurred in Yala, Narathiwat, and 
Pattani to a great extent: Commonly shared cultural bonds and values based on their 
“Malayness” have kept this ethnic community bound together over the years despite an 
ongoing conflict between this “Patani” identity and strong external pressures from the 
Thai national government to enforce a national “Thai” identity. By examining Patani’s 
history, we can get a better sense of the immense pride, strong cultural ties, and deep 
seated desire for self-determination that all remain prevalent among some groups in the 
region, even several hundred years after their creation. 
a. Early Patani History Prior to 1200 CE 
Most of the early history of the Patani region can be gleaned from journals 
and reports maintained by Chinese merchants and Buddhist monks, such as I Tsing, who 
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were traveling through Southeast Asia (SEA) in order to pursue commerce or learn about 
the various neighboring kingdoms that existed outside of Chinese territories. As early as 
500 CE records from the Liang Dynasty mention the Kingdom of Langkasuka (200–1400 
CE), which was primarily Hindu-Malay in terms of its ethnicity and religious beliefs, and 
predominantly occupied the regions of southern Thailand that would later be established 
as the Patani Sultanate during the 15th century. Along with Old Kedah (which contained 
the province of Satun), Langkasuka is frequently recognized as one of the oldest 
kingdoms on the Malay Peninsula. Although it was a hub for ocean going trade moving 
through the Gulf of Thailand, and became economically powerful in the region during the 
period from 600 to 700 CE, it would ultimately be eclipsed by other Southeast Asian 
kingdoms and lose a great deal of its power in the region during the 14th century.  
Part of Langkasukas’ dissolution was tied to the fact that toward the end of 
the late 7th century, it had fallen under the control of a powerful Hindu-Buddhist 
thalassocratic empire called Srivijaya (500- 1300 CE). Srivijaya was centered around the 
capital of Palembang on the island of Sumatra and had gradually expanded its control 
throughout the maritime regions of the Malacca and Sunda straits, the Java Sea, and the 
Gulf of Thailand. In addition to the shifts in political control within Southeast Asia, this 
increased amount of maritime traffic around Indonesia in the 10th and 11th century also 
brought increased contact with Arab sailors, Muslim traders and explorers, as well as 
naval forces from Islamic countries that had become prolific in the Indian Ocean and 
surrounding waters.80 These foreign visitors brought their religious beliefs with them into 
the region, and there are several documented cases in which local SEA leaders requested 
Islamic teachers to visit their kingdoms and share their beliefs. In short order, small 
Islamic communities began to sprout up throughout regions of SEA such as Aceh and 
Pasai, thereby helping this religion to spread to new groups of converts and territories. 
Although concrete evidence from this period is sparse, it is believed that much like Satun  
and Kedah on the western side of the Malay Peninsula, the process of Islamic conversion 
and Muslim communities developing in the Patani region may have seen some embryonic 
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beginnings during this time as well. This oceanic monopoly on maritime choke points 
and sea-going trade made Srivijaya wealthy and powerful for a number of centuries, but 
it began to fall into decline toward 1370 CE. As Srivijaya began to lose its control over 
local maritime commerce, the Patani region, which still fell under the auspices of the 
Langkasuka authorities, experienced a growing economic benefit from trade across the 
Malay Peninsula and along the coastal regions.81 Its capital (also called Patani) was 
strategically placed at the mouth of a large river that facilitated rice production and the 
ability of sea vessels to make port calls, but was still remote enough to discourage 
widespread encroachment by western powers in subsequent years. 
b. The Ayutthaya Dynasty, 1351–1767 
In 1457, the raja of Langkasuka converted to Islam and this conversion 
was extended by default to the Patani region as well.82 Although Patani may have 
“officially” converted to Islam several hundred years after Satun and Kedah, these beliefs 
became deeply rooted in the region quickly and were closely bound to the Malay 
language and ethnic identity that already existed in the region. In the midst of this 
religious conversion, the Malay Sultanate of Patani also became increasingly well 
entrenched as a maritime entrepot in the Gulf of Thailand and surrounding waters 
following the Portuguese capture of Malacca in 1511. As a result, Patani continued to 
conduct business during this period and subsequent decades not only with Chinese 
merchants, but with Portuguese, Japanese, Dutch, and English traders as well. Foreign 
companies such as the United East India Company and the English East India Company 
began to set up trading posts and warehouses within the Patani Sultanate between 1603 
and 1612 in order to gain access to the wares of Chinese merchants who frequented the 
markets of Patani. This increased economic growth provided the sultans of Patani with 
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the means to support and expand their regional power, a fact that helped contribute to 
their sense of prestige and majesty, not only to themselves, but also to the foreign visitors 
who came into contact with Patani. 
Along with the fiscal benefits of this expanded trade flow from 1500–
1700, the Patani Sultanate also became well known as a “Cradle of Islam” throughout 
Southeast Asia during these years.83 Much like the region of Aceh in northwestern 
Sumatra, Patani had developed a widely respected reputation on the Malay Peninsula for 
having an extensive network of religious schools, hosting highly educated Islamic  
teachers who had studied in the Middle East and producing well respected Islamic 
scholars itself. This particular era of the Patani Sultanatefrom 1584 to 1750  is frequently 
referred to as the “Golden Age” of its history. During this period, several widely 
respected female Muslim rulers such as Ratu Hijau (“The Green Queen”), Ratu Biru 
(“The Blue Queen”), Ratu Ungu (“The Purple Queen”) and Ratu Kuning (“The Yellow 
Queen”) maintained a cosmopolitan court of highly trained officials and leaders. These 
individuals helped to develop the Patani Sultanate’s economic and military capabilities to 
much higher levels than they had been in previous years. Patani also aligned itself with 
other like-minded allies, such as Pehang and the Sultanate of Johor, which helped to 
further solidify Patani’s identity as an Islamic Sultanate, as well as providing a larger 
degree of collective political and military power as well. These economic, religious, and 
political events represented the first stirring of a developing separate ethnic identity 
within Patani that would grow stronger as the years passed. 
During the same two same centuries that Patani was pursuing ascendancy 
to regional power, the Ayutthaya Dynasty had extended considerable amounts of political 
control throughout the isthmus and shaped it into a single unified state with a “hub and 
spoke” administrative model. Ayutthaya existed as the central “hub” of control and 
projected power out to the many peripheral vassal states under its dominion. This process 
provided for a fairly moderate self-governing system in which the vassal states and 
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tributary areas owed allegiance to the king of Ayutthaya but central control of the 
periphery remained limited. Subservience to Ayuttthaya was frequently demonstrated by 
paying the tribute of bunga mas every three years or providing people for the practice of 
corvee and military service. However, the vassal states maintained a great deal of 
autonomy in their own day-to-day activities.  
Much like other SEA dynasties that preceded it, Ayutthaya was soon 
facing new challenges that threatened its potential survival. The Toungoo Dynasty in 
Burma, for example, was becoming a much larger regional threat from a military 
perspective and in short order Ayutthaya was faced with a deepening crisis in Siamese-
Burmese relations. In 1569, Toungoo military forces united with Siamese rebels to attack 
the capital of Ayutthaya and drag the Siamese royal family off into captivity in Burma. In 
their place, the Burmese installed a Siamese provincial governor by the name of 
Dhammaraja as a political figurehead from 1569–1590. Siamese independence was 
ultimately restored by King Naresuan the Great from 1590 to 1605 when he managed to 
organize an effective rebellion against the Burmese and by 1600 had actually managed to 
drive the foreign invaders from Siam.84 Although Naresuan managed to re-unify the 
Ayutthaya Kingdom by 1590, the 21-year gap of central authority had left Patani in a 
state of virtual autonomy for over two decades. This relative independence and Patani’s 
own growing strength would contribute to additional power struggles between the two 
actors in later years. Consequently, the historical record shows rebellion and conflict 
between Ayutthaya and Patani became more frequent in the late 1600s, as evidenced by 
the military expeditions the Siamese King Prasit Thong sent against Patani in 1673 and 
1680.85 
As Ayutthaya recovered from its brutal struggles with the Burmese in the 
late 1500s and early 1600s, several new developments began to occur within Siam itself. 
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The Ayutthaya monarchy began to take on a god-like, ritualistic, and absolute quality that 
referenced ancient link to the Khmer kingdoms of old, particularly the powerful Angkor 
Era that existed from 900–1300 CE. It also capitalized on trade, taxes, mercenaries, and 
various types of assistance from foreign visitors such as the Portuguese, Dutch, French, 
Chinese, Persians, British, and Indians to rebuild its power and grandeur to new heights, 
causing the French to proclaim that “In the Indies there is no state that is more 
monarchical than Siam.”86  
Buddhism also became much more prominent in Siamese culture during 
the late 1600s, and in short order many older Hindu beliefs of the royal court were soon 
melded with the Buddhist Sangha in a new symbiotic relationship of mutual support.87 
The aristocratic rulers of Ayutthaya, such as King Borommakot (r. 1733–1758), 
increasingly protected and sponsored the Sangha. The Buddhist monkhood, in turn, 
provided legitimacy for the monarchy through the promotion of institutions such as the 
thotsaphit ratchatham (“10 laws of royal conduct”). These events deeply shaped the 
character and import of the monarchy and Buddhism within the country and would 
resurface again in future years to ultimately have long-lasting impacts on the formation of 
a national identity within Thailand during the early 20th century. This focus on the 
monarchy and Buddhism as two critical parts of Thai nationalism would set the stage for 
additional conflicts between the central government and Patani in the years ahead.  
Despite these evolutions in the monarchy and the religious character of 
Siam, the Ayutthaya Dynasty also underwent one final cycle of decline during the late 
1700s, when the long-standing conflict between the Konbaung Dynasty of Burma and 
                                                 
86 Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History of Thailand, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 14. 
87 A similar evolutionary development in which the monarchy bonded with religious institutions was 
also seen in Cambodia and Burma as well. 
53 
 
Ayutthaya flared up once again.88 Despite entreaties from Ayutthaya for peace, Burma 
sent three immense armies from Ava against the Siamese in order to annihilate the capital 
of its neighbor. The massive fortifications and large numbers of defensive cannons the 
Siamese had built up during the previous decades were slowly reduced to rubble during a 
multi-year siege that finally breached the walls of Ayutthaya in 1767. This event inflicted 
a serious blow to the Ayutthaya Kingdom and effectively ended its control of Siam. 
Anything of value was quickly looted and carried off, the remaining Siamese population 
who had not escaped the Burmese onslaught or been killed outright were taken back to 
Ava as captives, and most remaining Siamese buildings, temples, or chronicles of 
Ayutthaya were burned and leveled to the ground until all that remained of the once 
powerful kingdom was “heaps of ruins and ashes.”89 
c. Chakri Dynasty and the Bangkok Period, 1767–1902 
As noted in our examination of Satun and Kedah, the peripheral regions of 
the country experienced a brief respite from central control between the collapse of 
Ayutthaya and the establishment of the short-lived Sukothai and more permanent Chakri 
dynasties. A similar development took place in Patani as well during the aftermath of 
Ayutthaya’s collapse in 1767. The elite leadership in Patani was quick to declare 
independence for the region following the defeat of Ayutthaya and there was a belief that 
the sultanate could regain the autonomy it had enjoyed during 1500 to 1700 CE. 
Unfortunately for Patani, there was a gradual resurgence of power in the Siamese 
kingdom when new Siamese leaders such as Phaya Taksin, Mahasura Singhanat, and 
Thong Duang managed to reestablish a new Siamese capital at Bangkok. As this city 
grew in size and reputation, and the Burmese threat diminished, people began to filter 
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back into the region. By 1782, a new dynasty had been established when Thong Duang 
(who was now known as Phraphutthayotfa Chulalok) was placed on the throne and 
crowned as King Yofta (Rama I). This event marked the formal establishment of the 
Chakri Dynasty and this monarchy would maintain power throughout the country for 
close to 150 years. Although the Patani sultanate maintained relations with the Chakri 
dynasty and provided the bunga mas like other regional tributary states, this relationship 
became increasingly contentious between Bangkok and Patani during this period. As 
early as 1776, Patani had begun to refuse to contribute troops to the Siamese kingdom’s 
defense and rebellions against the Chakri leadership had started to foment. This 
movement toward autonomy and independence was marked by the Patani Sultan’s 
attempt to rally support around its own commonly shared identities and bonds. For 
example, the Malay Sultanate of Patani Darul Makrif attempted to create a type of proto-
nationalism that would reinforce the concept of Patani as an autonomous political entity 
during the late 1700s using new types of symbols and concepts as illustrated by Figure 3. 
This particular image is the flag of Negara Patani Raya or the “Greater Patani State” that 
was designed and used during the late 17th and early 18th century.90 The crest on the left 
side of the flag was the symbol of the Patani kingdom itself, which evoked memories of 
Patani grandeur and power that existed during the 15th to 17th centuries. The 
development of ideas and concepts such as this illustrates how the sultans of the Patani 
region were beginning to define their identity and local control in a variety of different 
ways that were consistent with the rise of nationalism in other areas of the world during 
this time period. Not only were they drawing upon several hundred years of long-
standing Malay ethnicity, shared Islamic religion, and local geography of the region, but 
now they were also beginning to characterize Patani as a political entity as well. In 1782, 
the Chakri Dynasty began to assert its control over the center and peripheries of Siam, 
and this growing consolidation of power and expansion by the Chakri kingdom brought it 
into greater points of friction with the developing nation-state of Patani.   
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Figure 3.   Flag of the Greater Patani State, circa 18th century 
By 1785, although the local leadership in Patani increasingly tried to 
establish an independent identity that was autonomous from Chakri Dynasty control, the 
Siamese kings were taking additional steps to consolidate their grip over the southern 
territories. In Bangkok, King Rama I (r. 1782–1809) declared that the Patani Sultanate, 
along with Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu, was no longer just a tributary part of the 
Siamese empire, but was in fact a subordinate region of the Siamese Kingdom. 
Accordingly, King Rama I took steps to establish that the subservient relationship of 
Patani was well understood. Some of the tactics Rama I used included sending military 
expeditions to the region, posting officials in positions of authority within Patani, and 
then ultimately deposing the raja of Patani, Sultan Muhammad, during 1785 in order to 
install Raja Tengku Lamadin as a new ruler who Bangkok felt would obey its commands. 
Siamese intervention in Patani’s internal politics in 1785 is particularly poignant in the 
opinion of many researchers because it marked the first time that Siam had directly 
controlled the appointment of Patani’s sultanate leadership.91 Despite Bangkok’s efforts, 
however, Raja Tengku subsequently attempted to conspire with Vietnam to attack the 
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Chakri center of power in Bangkok which led to another series of rebellions and Siamese 
suppression during 1789–1791. Again, the Chakri Dynasty replaced the leadership in 
Patani by appointing Tengku’s successor, Dato Pengkalan, as their proxy in 1808, but 
Dato also defied the Siamese leadership by attempting to encourage armed resistance 
within Patani. Interestingly, these appointees were both local Malay Muslims, but this 
fact still did not suppress Patani’s inclinations towards rebellion. In later years, Bangkok 
would install Thai-Buddhist leadership in the region, but the conflict between the two 
actors still continued. 
Frustrated by this constant cycle of revolution and suppression, King 
Rama II (r. 1809–1824) divided Patani into seven smaller provinces, or muang, during 
1816 in an attempt to effectively quell any future rebellions. This action created the 
provinces of Saiburi, Pattani, Nongchik, Yala, Yarang, Ra-ngae, and Rahman, several of 
which still exist today, albeit with different administrative or provincial borders. This 
action was designed to “divide and conquer” the restive south by establishing  
administrative units that were easier to control, facilitated tax collection, and could also 
have the local sultans of these new muang (who were appointed by Bangkok) be directly 
supervised by the Buddhist leadership located in nearby Ligor (Nakhon Si Thammarat). 
Paradoxically, the more Bangkok tried to control Patani, the more vehement the 
resistance in the area became. There was another series of tax protests and revolts that 
occurred in 1832 and 1838. The Siamese government reacted to these provocations with 
particular savagery, and the violent suppression of Patani in 1838 quickly reduced the 
once powerful sultanate into a dramatically impoverished area, a condition which has 
persisted throughout much of the region even into the 21st century.92  
The next 64 years were fairly quiet in Patani as the Siamese government 
was more focused on defending against external threats, such as the one it experienced 
during the Cambodian crisis of 1840, or its negotiations with British and American 
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diplomatic envoys who were demanding legal and economic concessions from Siam.93 
The net result of these events was that Siam maintained a less intrusive presence in the 
Patani area from 1838 to 1902 because it had larger concerns elsewhere and overall 
resistance in Patani at the time was slight. However, as nationalism became a stronger 
force in the country and Patani recovered, conflict would develop again between these 
two actors.  
d. Nationalism and the Modern Era, 1902–Present 
From 1901–1902, the relationship between Patani and Bangkok began to 
deteriorate when the Chakri Dynasty again attempted to expand and consolidate its 
control over Siam’s southern peripheral borders. This increased presence and push for 
control in Patani was largely due to the Chakri Dynasty’s growing concerns over British 
expansion in Malaysia. In order to counter this potential threat, King Chulalongkorn 
steadily implemented the methods of administrative control (monthon thesaphiban) 
recommended and designed by Prince Damrong. The monthon thesaphiban soon took the 
southern region away from its historical precedents of indirect and limited administrative 
control and established a much more direct and pervasive form of control from 
Bangkok.94 Another major grievance that the Patani elites voiced during 1902 was the 
new restrictions put upon Sharia Law and Islamic courts. In an attempt to consolidate the 
legal procedures in the southern provinces (and make them subject to the control and 
oversight of Siamese authorities), local religious courts now fell under the supervision 
and control of the provincial governors-general who had been appointed to control the 
administrative matters of southern Thailand. Many Patani Islamic leaders were outraged 
that a secular public official was now the final arbiter in what was seen as a judiciary 
function that needed to be conducted by local Qadis (Muslim judges). This restructuring 
of internal power and control within Patani was strongly resented by many local leaders, 
such as Raja Tengku Abdul Kadir (Phraya Pattani V), because their power was usurped. 
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During that same year, Tengku Abdul Kadir led a series of revolts against the Siamese 
government. The Siamese government subsequently imprisoned Kadir for two years and 
then only released him after he signed a pledge that he would abstain from any 
involvement in local politics in the future.  
In 1906 and 1909, two other critical events took place that would 
inextricably define the long-term relationships between the Patani Muslims and the 
Siamese government: First, in 1906, there was a restructuring of the “area of the seven 
provinces” back into four consolidated regions: Yala, Pattani, Saiburi, and Narathiwat. 
Following the reorganization of the former Malay provinces into four new regions, the 
task of running these areas fell under the recently created office of the Ministry of the 
Interior or Mahathai. This new method of controlling local politics via centralized, 
modern bureaucracies strongly reinforced the concepts of civil service, office 
appointments, local supervision, and direct control in Patani by the Thai government and 
Thai Buddhists. Second, in 1909, the Siamese government signed the Anglo-Thai treaty 
with Britain in which Siam gave up the provinces of Kelantan, Perak, Kedah, and Perlis 
to Britain, but managed to maintain control of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Songkhla, and 
Satun. Both of these changes saw to it that Siam’s control over the Patani region was 
officially recognized by external powers and demarcated on a map accordingly. These 
administrative changes also allowed Bangkok to extract taxes more easily and extend 
their administrative control over the periphery more effectively. However, they also 
caused a great deal of resentment and discontent amongst local Malay elites who were 
being co-opted and stripped of their power.  
The general angst among the elites of Patani caused by the dramatic 
changes of 1906 and 1909 reached a boiling point by 1922 when these inititatives also 
began to negatively affect the general population of Patani as well. Frustrated by the 
religious restrictions imposed by the Siamese leadership, increasing taxes, and exorbitant 
land rents, many groups of local villagers refused to interact with local Siamese officials 
or pay their taxes. The Patani Malays also began to form various liberation movements to 
unify their efforts and mobilize additional local people to their cause. Tengku Abdul 
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Kadir (who was now living in Kelantan) was a key player in organizing this growing 
voice of protest, providing advice and assistance to political allies and community leaders 
who were still located in Patani. Kadir was not alone in these efforts to provide influence, 
support and experience. Several other prominent Malay Muslim leaders and politicians 
from Patani, such as Haji Sulong, Chaem Prongyong (Haji Samsuddin), and Tengku 
Mahmud Mahyiddin (Kadir’s son) would continue to fight for the political representation 
and ethno-religious autonomy of the Patani Maly-Muslims in the decades to follow.   
The next phase of sweeping changes came to Patani following the 1932 
revolution and the dissolution of the absolute monarchy maintained by the Chakri 
Dynasty. The new constitutional monarchy that was established in the country gave 
Patani elites hope that this development might allow the Patani Malay Muslims a greater 
opportunity to participate in national politics and self-representation. For instance, 
Muslims were now allowed to sit on the national parliament whereas before this period 
the Chakri Dynasty was comprised and administered primarily by Thai-Buddhist nobility. 
The monthon thesaphiban system was also abolished.95 Although these small concessions 
looked promising, they were quickly overshadowed by the hyper-nationalist policies of 
Phibun Songkhram from 1939–1945 that many Patani Muslims saw as a direct threat to 
their ethnic identity and way of life. Phibun deeply admired what he saw as strong, 
national governments that developed during this period in Germany, Italy, and Japan. In 
many regards, Phibun tried to emulate these countries and mold Thailand into a nation 
using a similar model. Accordingly, Phibun instituted a myriad of mandates that enforced 
standards of behavior and beliefs that often directly conflicted with the long standing 
religious and linguistic identities that had developed in the Patani region.  
The outbreak of World War II aggravated cleavages between Bangkok and 
Patani even further. Phibun ultimately decided to collaborate with the Japanese Imperial 
military government because he believed this Asian neighbor was a superb example of a 
strong, independent nation that could openly defy the western nations that had pressured 
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Thailand in previous years. The residents of Patani, on the other hand, reached out to ally 
themselves with the British and oppose both Phibun’s government and the Japanese 
incursions into Siam. Many Patani leaders, such as Prince Tun Mahmud Mahyuddin,  
seized the opportunity to pursue a strategy of mutual military cooperation and assistance 
with the British in the struggle against the Japanese due to the opportunities this course of 
action presented: It cemented the long-standing connections local Patani leaders had with 
Malaya to the south, and most importantly to the Kelantan Muslims across the border 
because of the many social, economic, and religious bonds they shared. Additionally, by 
aligning themselves with the allied forces during World War II, the elites of Patani hoped 
to counter Phibun’s intrusive cultural policies that had aggrieved them since 1939. There 
was also the hope that the British would support notions for Patani to be either 
recognized as an autonomous and independent region or even possibly grant Patani 
accession into Malaya after the war had ended.96 
During the aftermath of World War II, many Southeast Asian nations such 
as Indonesia and Malaysia had a growing sense of national identity and aspirations for 
self-determination. In many regards, southern Thailand was no different from its 
neighbors. Patani began to see the growth of various civic organizations that frequently 
provided a collective voice for the regional inhabitants of Patani to gain increased 
representation and recognition within the country. The Patani Malay Muslims also hoped 
that the British would remember the allegiance that had been in place during the war and 
support the provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani in their ongoing appeals with the 
Thai government for autonomy or independence. 97 Unfortunately, due to the reliance that 
Britain had on Thai rice imports to support the populace of Malaya and an increasing 
desire to combat the growing threat of communism, the British government felt that it 
was unwise to confront the Thai national leadership on the issue of Patani nationalism, 
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despite promises made by English colonial leaders during the war. As a result, the Patani 
Muslim’s requests for external assistance did not actually bring about any changes in 
their relationship with the Thai government, political status, or recognition of their ethno-
religious identity. 
In 1947, a popular and well-educated Islamic leader named Haji Sulong 
established another organization called to facilitate the political activism of the Patani 
Malay Muslims. Much like GAMPAR, the formation of PPM represented a new type of 
social mobilization in the region that could generate larger amounts of political power, 
increase international recognition of the Patani plight, and potentially compel the Thai 
government to come to the negotiation table for an equitable solution to this dispute. 
Despite the fact that the Thai government had outlawed the PPM and there were intense 
personal risks to being associated with this organization, Haji Sulong saw it as a personal 
obligation to his fellow Patani Muslims to represent their collective communities in the 
struggle for self-rule, linguistic and cultural rights, as well as the restoration of Sharia 
law. To this same end, Sulong published his “seven points” petition in April of 1947 and 
sent this document to national leaders in Bangkok, an act that soon resulted in his arrest 
and imprisonment for charges of treason and conspiracy against the Thai government.98 
This increased call for representation and equal rights on the part of Patani was soon 
further complicated by a military coup in Bangkok that took place in November of that 
same year. During this coup, the republican government of Pridi Banomyong was 
overturned and Phibun regained power within Thailand along with his military cohorts, 
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an event that sparked a great deal of fear in the Patani communities that they were 
returning to the dark days of 1939 all over again.99 
Perhaps it should be of little surprise that the ongoing struggle between the 
Thai national government and the Patani people over their rights and grievances,  
combined with the unexpected return of an intensely disliked and controversial leader,  
and marked by increased social mobilization on the part of the Patani Muslims, would 
quickly result in the worst rebellion and conflict the country had seen since the early part 
of the 1900s.  
In one particularly violent event, an uprising took place in Dusun Nyor 
during 1948, when roughly 1,000 Patani Malay Muslims took up arms against Thai 
national police forces, with a large number of casualties inflicted on both sides.100 The 
events at Dusun Nyor represented the first time that widespread violence and resistance 
had broken out in southern Thailand following World War II, and some observers feel 
that this specific incident fueled the subsequent separatist and insurgent movements that 
erupted within Thailand’s southern provinces in following years. In the wake of this 
violence, a petition was sent to the United Nations with over 250,000 signatures from the 
Malay Muslim inhabitants of southern Thailand calling for the region’s accession to the 
New Federation of Malaya. The Thai government however, felt that to give in to this 
initiative would cause many of the other ethnic groups within Thailand (such as the Mon, 
Khmer, Lao, Chinese, and Hmong) to call for autonomy as well. Much like the “domino 
theory,” the Thai government believed that the country might disintegrate if one restive 
region was allowed to secede. Instead, Thai government officials dug in for a long and 
hard fight to maintain their unicultural policies and centralized rule of these peripheral 
regions.101  
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This decision to force an ethnic assimilation policy upon Patani and avoid 
negotiation or compromise has largely followed the trajectory of the Thai government’s 
domestic politics well into the 21st century. Although the conflict between Patani and 
Bangkok has had cycles of both increased and decreased violence, the root issues have 
never really gone away. The different concepts of political rule and ethnic identity  
maintained by these two groups led them into several hundred years of prolonged 
conflict, a fact that became increasingly pronounced as the Thai national government 
attempted to force the assimilation issue via even more intrusive and violent methods.   
D. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS FOR PEACE IN SATUN  
1. Satun’s Cultural Influences for Nonviolence 
Now that we have previously discussed some of the major historical influences 
that contributed to the absence of violence within Satun and the presence of violence in 
Patani, it is important that we review some of the contributing factors that have deeply 
shaped the development of Satun as a Muslim Minority Province (MMP) and helped to 
define its relationship with the Thai government. In particular, linguistic and religious 
influences have been important in maintaining some of the constructive linkages that 
exist between Bangkok and Satun. 
a. Language  
One of the lynchpins of the Thai government’s assimilation process during 
1921 to 1945 was the standardization of language throughout the country. In Satun, this 
process was more easily accepted than in Patani due to the fact that the people in Satun 
demonstrated an ethnic and cultural identity that was more adaptable than what was 
found in Patani. The residents of Satun, known as the Sam Sams, were investigated by a 
number of different visitors and researchers in the early 1800s. Many of these observers 
elucidated on the linguistic habits of the Sam Sams and what their potential origins might 
be: Were they in fact Malays who had adopted the trappings of Siamese culture? Or were 
they Siamese who converted to Islam? In 1826, Captain Henry Burney observed the 
cultural traits of the Sam Sams and then wrote in his journal that: 
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There is not a respectable and well-informed native of the Qedah [Kedah] 
who will attempt to deny that previous to the introduction of 
Mahometanism [sic] his country was exclusively inhabited by the Siamese 
race who were worshippers of Boodh [Buddha] or some other Hindoo 
Deity.”102 
Although many may argue that this “chicken and egg” type of argument is 
pointless and impossible to answer, it in fact has important implications about how this 
community developed its particular cultural identity and whether it might gravitate more 
easily toward a connection with either Siamese or Malayan political governance 
structures or national narratives. In 1821, a Scottish diplomat and colonial administrator 
named John Crawfurd declared that the Sam Sams were “…people of the Siamese race 
who have adopted the Mohammedan religion, and who speak a language which is a 
mixed jargon of the two peoples.”103  
In 1900, the blended cultural aspects of the Sam Sams was further 
documented by Prince Damrong Rajahubnab, a royal leader and scholar who is 
frequently credited as the father of Thai nationalism, the national education system, 
provincial administration methods, and the national health system.104 Damrong noted 
during his travels through Satun that the Sam Sams used a particular Malay dialect 
known as bahasa ibunda, which is composed of an older southern Thai language that had 
a wide variety of Malay words embedded within it. He theorized that these people were 
essentially Siamese from an ethnic perspective but had adopted Islamic practices while 
still maintaining many of their Thai socio-cultural practices to include several linguistic 
patterns. These observations would seem to indicate that there were already Siamese 
cultural roots in Satun that existed before the local populations began to worship Islam 
and utilize parts of the Malay language. This evolutionary path seems to have contributed 
to a pervasive attitude in Satun in which its inhabitants were more likely to accept Thai as 
an official language than the Malay communities in Patani who spoke Jawi. 
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Prior to 1909, it is believed more than 90 percent of Satun’s Muslims 
spoke bahasa ibunda.105 In the wake of their assimilation via the implementation of these 
types of national language policies, these statistics within Satun changed dramatically 
during the 20th century. Today, it is estimated that over 99 percent of the residents in 
Satun speak Thai as a primary language.106 Although there are some small local areas in 
Satun where Malay is the predominant dialect, the majority of these groups also speak 
Thai as a second language. Many authors, such as Thomas Parks and Surin Pitsuwan, 
have theorized that the ability to communicate with Thai bureaucrats at the local and 
national level has encouraged and facilitated Satun’s participation in both the democratic 
process and being able to efficiently resolve grievances. Furthermore, many Muslim 
families in Satun see the ability to speak Thai as an important asset for their children to 
possess as they grow into adults. By speaking the national language, it allows young 
people from Satun to get jobs more easily, travel to other regions such as Phuket or 
Bangkok, and survive more effectively within the larger society. As a result of these 
developments, it has been noted that Thai speaking Muslim communities are most 
common in the south-western Thai provinces of Satun, Songkhla, Phang-Nga and Trang, 
which are somewhat closer to the center of power located in Bangkok rather than the 
Malay regions to the south. This phenomenon of Thai speaking Muslims is less common 
in the Patani region where Jawi remains the first language of most Malay Muslims. 
b. Religion 
Satun existed as a Hindu-Malay kingdom for many years before it adopted 
Islam as the dominant religion in the region. Residents of Satun appear to be more 
flexible in their religious practices and allow themselves a certain degree of compromise 
in how they observe the precepts of Islam. Interestingly, the British administrators of 
Penang and many northern Malaysian Muslims often viewed the Satun Sam Sams as 
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prone to excessive criminality and being intolerably lax with their Islamic practices. One 
extremely unflattering appraisal of the Sam Sam population was documented by J. R. 
Logan in 1867: 
Some generations back, [the Sam Sam] were converted to 
Mohammedanism, a religion which still sits loosely on them…Many of 
them are more stupid and ignorant even than the Malays in the same 
condition of life, and many are knavish, thievish, and addicted to gambling 
and opium-smoking…There are among them men habitually predatory, 
and dangerous from their treachery and ferocity. Their cunning, however 
is without intelligent fore-thought and subtlety of fraud…107 
Logan’s observations were mirrored in some aspects by Abdul Rahman in 
1930, when Rahman described his interactions with a local Sam Sam man about marrying 
outside of his faith, which was considered a serious sin in the Islamic faith: 
In most cases, the so-called Muslims [that is, the Sam Sam] cared very 
little and knew nothing about the religion…An incident concerned two 
young people, the man a Muslim Sam-Sam and the girl, a Thai Buddhist. 
They were intent on getting married, and the man was prepared to give up 
his religion for the girl he loved…Then in desperation I asked him to 
consider the Holy Prophet Mohammad, and what he said shocked me. 
“Why should I consider Mohammed; he has never been in my kampong to 
see me, not even once.”108 
Although it is easy to characterize the Sam Sams of Satun as being 
morally bankrupt or sacrilegious, it appears that these behaviors could also be described 
as highly pragmatic in nature. The environment found within the Kedah border region 
during this period was extremely unstable after the Siamese invasion in 1821 and 
banditry and lawlessness became endemic during this juncture. Logan also may have 
been viewing the situation from a very ethnocentric point of view which was not 
uncommon among western Europeans during their forays into Southeast Asia. The 
flexibility in Satun’s religious beliefs (to include conversion or intermarriage) is still a 
fairly common occurrence in this province. An article from 1994 documented the rates of 
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Muslim-Buddhist marriages in a village within Satun in which the ratio of Muslims to 
Buddhists was roughly 50/50 and both groups spoke the same southern Thai dialect. In 
this particular example, the intermarriage rates were approximately 20 percent, which 
was substantially higher than other areas such as Kelantan where intermarriage rates were 
roughly 3 percent.109 These trends seem to indicate a different approach to the sanctity of 
religious practices or marriage in Satun, and other field interviews would seem to support 
this inference as well.  
2. Satun’s Institutional Influences for Nonviolence 
Much like the discussion on culture, the term “institutions” is often defined in 
different ways depending on the context and focus that is being used to examine it. Does 
it have to be imposed by a government? Can a society generate its own institutions 
without having to codify them? Perhaps it could be defined as a contextual influence? 
Here, I discuss institutions as a function of external influences or shaping devices that are 
introduced by governments, and therefore are creations that can be implemented as well 
as dissolved. Given this definition, we will examine Satun’s institutions of education, 
center-periphery relations, political representation, and provision for domestic security 
forces and discuss how they may have contributed to the current conditions of stability 
and quiescence that are observed in Satun. 
a. Education  
There is little doubt that the Thai national agenda for schools and 
education represents one of the largest grievances voiced within Patani’s Malay Muslim 
provinces. For example, in 1921, the Thai government instituted the Primary Education 
Act, which mandated that all children must receive four to five years of training in the 
Thai language.110 Many Malay Muslims were aghast at the prospect of the government 
telling local communities what they should teach their children. Worse, these policies 
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could slowly erase the ties to the Malay culture that were maintained through traditional 
forums for language and education such as Mosques and pondoks. This same conflict 
broke out again in 1939 when the Phibun regime decided to create a compulsory National 
Education Program that mandated even greater amounts of educational curriculum with 
nationalist undertones and further undermined the ability of Muslim pondoks to teach 
their students according to Islamic precepts. 
In Satun however, the implementation of state schools with a Thai 
nationalist curriculum was accepted more easily than in the other southern regions. The 
Kedah sultanate had not promoted public education within Satun during the years that it 
controlled this province, let alone built any schools there, so the introduction of state 
schools was viewed as a welcome change by many residents of Satun. Satun’s first public 
school was actually established in 1910 and was generally perceived in the region as a 
sign of progress and social development rather than cultural domination. Prior to this 
institution being provided by the government, the only schools and education available in 
the region were at Buddhist Wats, Mosques or local pondoks. Because Satun already had 
linguistic roots in the Thai language and locally created options were not particularly 
robust, Satun’s residents were more cooperative with the central government’s goals 
during 1939 than the Patani region. 
b. Center-periphery Relations 
Another factor in the absence of violence within Satun was the decision on 
the part of local elite leaders to engage with, and participate in, the new systems imposed 
by the Thai government in order to facilitate effective center-periphery relations. 
Frequently, this decision was due to intricate personal ties local leaders in Satun had to 
the center of power located in Bangkok and the inherent benefits such a course of action 
would bring. It was common for these government officials to be relative “outsiders,” in 
that they were not “sons of Satun soil,” but they were frequently recruited from 
neighboring provinces or other areas that had close historical or social ties to Satun. This 
included locations such as Kedah, Nakhorn Si Thammarat, or Songkhla. Since these 
appointed leaders were from the same regional area, they frequently had similar beliefs, 
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language, experiences, and backgrounds as the local population. This process of 
appointing suitable delegates made the process more palatable to the citizenry when new 
regional administrators of Satun were selected. 
This tendency can be seen during the late 1800s when Satun’s historical 
line of sultans slowly declined in power and Raja Tengku Abdul Rahman died without an 
heir. King Chulalongkorn then directed the viceroy of Satun, Tengku Baharuddin bin Ku 
Meh to take control of the province in 1900.111 In many regards, this slow dissolution of 
the elite lineage in Satun was very different from the changes that were made in Patani. 
Rahman had no one to pass on his position to, so the Siamese government found an 
adequate replacement that was also acceptable to the local population. The appointment 
of a local Muslim leader in Satun who was conversant in both Thai and the local bahasa 
ibunda language, had served for the previous five years in  the region as viceroy, and 
during that time managed to develop numerous relationships with local community 
leaders ultimately made this transition of power more palatable to the residents of Satun. 
Because of Tengku Baharuddin’s appointment by the king himself, and his continuing 
cooperation with Bangkok, he was given significant freedom to run the province with a 
great deal of autonomy. In Patani, by comparison, the Muslim elites were forcibly 
removed by the Siamese leadership but still maintained a large measure of strong popular 
support in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat. There were also several younger generations of 
Muslim elites present in the Patani provinces who were able to continue in their father’s 
stead, such as Abdul Kadir’s son, Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddin. This lineage of power 
and relationships that were found within Patani made it much more difficult for the 
Siamese government to install new leadership in these particular areas without triggering 
a certain amount of public discontent. 
Tengku Baharuddin’s successor in local Satun politics was another 
Muslim named Tui Bin Abdullah who was appointed as the governor of the province in 
1914. Tui Bin Abdullah had been educated in Bangkok, spoke both Thai and Malay, and 
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had already worked for the king on a number of previous assignments. Because of his 
connections and background, Tui Bin Abdullah was an acceptable choice for both the 
citizens of Satun and the government leaders in Bangkok. In addition, these two leaders 
were instrumental in establishing public schools throughout Satun and encouraging local 
people to learn the Thai language and agree to the suzerainty of the Thai government. 
c. Political Representation 
In a similar fashion to the constructive nature of center-periphery 
relationships between Satun and Bangkok, Satun was also able to engage in the political 
process in order to gain representation with the central government more easily than the 
Patani region. By utilizing a pragmatic outlook, aggressive lobbying in defense of their 
constituents and the use of Thai language in order to participate effectively in the political 
process, local civic leaders from Satun are frequently remembered for their ability to get 
development assistance, government concessions, and grievance resolutions to come to 
fruition. Che Abdullah Langputeh was one such individual who served as a minister of 
parliament during 1946 to 1968 and later became the Deputy Minister of Education. His  
legacy in Satun is still remembered today due to his effectiveness at protecting the region 
from onerous government initiatives and opening the larger political landscape of the 
country to Muslim participation from Satun. 
d. Security Forces and Domestic Order  
The English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, commented on the nature of 
the “social contract” in 1651 by theorizing that people will be willing to submit to 
political authority, and thereby relinquish some of their individual freedoms, in order to 
gain the benefits provided by the leadership they acquiesce to. One critical aspect of this 
contract is the provision to protect the governed population from harm and ensure 
domestic security is maintained.112 If this basic need is not provided by the government, 
citizens will often take it upon themselves to protect themselves, their families, and their 
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communities from any perceived threats they face. The development of professional 
military and police forces originated during King Chulalongkorn’s era of nation building 
and institutional reform, but how these forces are currently perceived in Satun and Patani 
are often quite different.  
In Satun, security forces maintain a much smaller and less aggressive 
profile that they do in Patani. In many respects, this reduced number of troop 
deployments in Satun is due to the fact that the province is not seen as a “threat” to the 
national objectives of the Thai government. These security units in Satun are not 
particularly intrusive in their activities and frequently maintain a positive working 
relationship with the local population, which prevents Satun from developing various 
grievances that are frequently associated with the road blocks, vehicle searches, armed 
guards, and military patrols that are commonly observed in Patani. There is also clear and 
unfettered communication between local security forces in Satun and the population they 
are assigned to protect that reflects a lack of fear and trepidation about the intent and 
trustworthiness of these security forces within the province. Both of these groups have a 
vested interest in keeping the peace and want to prevent the spread of violence within the  
community. To this same end, local citizens often keep an eye out for any “outsiders” 
who may try to enter the community with the intent of upsetting this balance and 
promptly report them to the authorities.113 
In Patani, the local security situation is not as positive or effective as it is 
in Satun. Royal Thai Army (RTA) and Royal Thai Police (RTP) are deployed throughout 
the region in immense numbers. Attacks on local citizens with firearms and bombs are 
frequent and there are allegations that local security forces often operate as black garbed 
“ninjas” in the middle of the night in order to abduct and interrogate citizens who are 
suspected of being involved in insurgent activity.114 These events have caused a 
pervasive atmosphere of uncertainty and terror in local villages and it is of little surprise 
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that Malay Muslim inhabitants of Patani have begun to form local “militias” in order to 
protect and patrol their communities.115 Tensions between Buddhists and Muslims in the 
Patani region are on the rise since 2004 and there are allegations that both groups are 
engaging in tit-for-tat attacks and ambushes against each other. This militarization of the 
communities in Patani has caused a security dilemma to develop between these religious 
communities and the situation remains highly unstable, with attacks apparently beginning 
to increase in magnitude and sophistication.116 
3. Satun’s Rational Choice Causes of Nonviolence 
The last aspect of Satun’s pursuit of nonviolence is closely linked to different 
several rational choice arguments. In this particular explanation, there are close ties to our 
earlier discussion on Hobbe’s theories regarding the symbiotic relationship of the social 
contract, civil society, and the desire of individuals to protect themselves and their 
communities from harm. There are also possible undercurrents of personal gain or 
economic incentives (both licit and illicit) for maintaining the peace in the region. At the 
heart of both of these possible explanations, however, is a utility-based decision making 
process in which individuals mentally calculate the gains and costs in a particular course 
of action. Ultimately, individuals will pursue courses of action that will benefit 
themselves the most, and these choices have ensured that Satun has been, and will 
continue to be, a region that does not display the extensive use of violence in a public 
forum. 
a. The Futility of Fighting a Larger Power 
When the Siamese Army and Navy invaded Kedah in 1821, it did so with 
overwhelming force from both ground and naval avenues of approach. This military 
expedition was extremely disruptive to the lives and professions of many citizens in the 
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region and most likely caused a certain amount of frustration, anxiety, anger, and fear to 
the people who lived within Satun, especially after the leadership of Kedah was forced to 
flee to another country. In response to this development, the citizens of Satun had the 
choice to either resist this invasion or accept the fact that they were seriously outmatched 
in terms of martial capability and accept the agenda of regional regime change that was 
being implemented by the Siamese government. From a utilitarian perspective, it appears 
that Satun’s population took a more pragmatic approach to this issue and decided to 
cooperate with Siamese officials and military units. This decision brought several 
different benefits along with it: higher levels of repression were not inflicted on the local 
people, it also created a favorable impression upon leaders in Bangkok that the residents 
of Satun were “good citizens” who were being cooperative and compliant, and finally this 
decision to avoid violent resistance shortened the duration of conflict within the region. 
Ironically, by pursuing a pragmatic and passive course of action, Satun’s population was 
actually given more freedom to make decisions within the local area and local leadership 
was later returned to the area in 1842. In many regards, the population of Satun has 
continued to execute this rational choice decision of not using violence against the Thai 
government for many of the same reasons that it did in 1821: fighting against a larger and 
more powerful opponent, especially if you have no deep seated reasons to pursue such a 
risky course of action, may simply bring about an even greater degree of suffering and 
destruction.      
b. Smuggling and the Black Market 
In an article from August of 2005, Anthony Davis described one of the 
rational choice explanations for the peace in Satun. According to Davis, powerful local 
leaders and businessmen have a vested interest in continuing to conduct highly profitable 
black market activities and smuggling operations along the coastline of western Thailand 
and via overland routes between Satun and Kedah. These illicit activities include 
smuggling diesel fuel, cattle, cigarettes, liquor, electronics, and endangered animal 
products into Thailand with the intent of avoiding Thailand’s expensive import taxes. 
There are also indicators of “exports” being shipped out of Thailand in the form of 
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narcotics and illegal weapons as well.117 In order to continue these illicit activities, it is 
imperative that Satun remains a quiet and tranquil region where extensive government 
intervention or the increased presence of security forces is avoided. Although this is an 
intriguing argument, empirical evidence is extremely hard to come by. Additionally, 
smuggling occurs in many regions of Thailand, such as the Laotian or Burmese borders 
as well as between the Patani and Kelantan regions of Malaysia. Due to the opaque nature 
of this activity, it is difficult to tell how much this particular variable may be influencing 
the outcome in Satun, but two things remain certain: First, based on seizures and arrests, 
smuggling is in fact taking place in the region, and second, it is invariably being 
conducted for utility based purposes (i.e., profits). 
c. Legitimate Economic Calculations 
Another more plausible rational choice explanation for the peace in Satun 
is the desire to obtain legitimate monies and funding from national authorities for public 
investments and development. The Thai government recently announced in early 2012 
that it had plans to invest roughly $2.7 billion dollars in 117 different development 
projects in Southern Thailand’s Andaman Sea coastal provinces of Ranong, Phuket, 
Krabi, Phang Nga, Trang, and Satun. 118 These infrastructure projects are planned to 
improve quality of life and access issues such as water resources, logistics support, 
highways, port facilities, tourism, health care, and education. The region of Phuket, just 
north of Satun, is one of the most profitable tourist destinations within the country, and it 
is estimated that the economic impact of this industry in Phuket alone represents 
$3.2 billion worth of annual revenue to the region. Tourism not only provides jobs to 
locals from nearby areas like Satun, but is also a valuable commodity to the national 
government in terms of revenue streams, international image, and encouraging foreign 
business. From the Thai government’s perspective, it will invariably want to invest its 
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budget in stable areas that will show a larger return on investments in local regions. 
Patani is noticeably absent from this list. For Satun, maintaining a peaceful environment 
means that these funds and infrastructure projects will continue to be provided, which is 
an immense economic incentive to keep the peace that carries a great deal of weight in a 
region that has historically low economic per capita income.  
d. Civil Society and the Pursuit of Peace 
Lastly, there is the rational choice influence that has been created by the 
development of a “civil society” within Satun. This term is usually associated with Adam 
Ferguson who developed the concept in the 18th century, but it has increasingly been 
used in the 20th century to define behaviors that occur outside of the spheres occupied by 
government or business.119 In a modern context, civil society has been discussed by a 
number of authors such as Ashutosh Varshney who investigated why some Hindu-
Muslim communities within India maintained cordial relationships while other Hindu-
Muslim communities degenerated into sectarian violence and bloodshed. Varshney 
argues that networks of engagement, in both associational and everyday interactions, are 
critical to mitigating ethnic tensions and conflicts.120 Where these elements were missing, 
violence was more likely to blossom quickly and spiral out of control. In Satun, this 
particular concept has manifested itself as either the congenial relationships that have 
developed between Muslim and Buddhist groups or the mechanisms they have developed 
to mitigate potential problems before they become worse.  
One example of these types of relationships can be found in the story 
related by Ryoko Nishii about how families in Satun who were faced with differing 
preferences about religious practices and funeral rites managed to resolve their 
differences of opinion on a micro level due to the constructive relationships they had 
cultivated between each other. In one particular event, a 29 year-old man from Satun 
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named Tak died suddenly one night in his home. Because Tak had converted to Islam, his 
wife wanted to prepare Tak’s body in accordance with Islamic tradition and laws. Tak’s 
family, who were Buddhists, argued that they should perform Buddhist rites for Tak after 
he died. Ultimately, Tak’s family took his body in order to cremate Tak as per the 
Buddhist practice, an event that greatly upset Tak’s wife Da and caused her to seek 
counsel from the Satun Provincial Islamic Committee, a former Islamic teacher, and her 
uncle in the province of Pattani.  
Although her uncle called the crematorium to make thinly veiled threats 
asking them if they “dared to cremate the body of a Muslim,” her Islamic teacher 
recommended that she quietly negotiate the matter with Tak’s family rather than pursuing 
the issue in an Islamic court.121 This conflict had the potential to polarize groups along 
religious lines and set the stage for future conflicts to occur. Instead, the two communities 
were able to employ different associational and everyday relationships to come to grips 
with this loss and avoid the possibility of this event becoming a much larger problem. In 
the aftermath of Tak’s death and his cremation in a Buddhist funerary ceremony, Tak’s 
mother still maintained friendly relations with Da a year later and they observed both 
Islamic and Buddhist practices of “making merit” for Tak together which indicated a 
genuine effort to mend the wounds that they had both suffered after his death.  
In an interesting turn of events, Ryoko Nishii also interviewed Sit, the new 
wife of Tak’s brother. Sit had converted from Islam to Buddhism when she married and 
felt that she needed to make her religious choices very clear to both her own family (who 
were Muslim) as well as her husband’s family (who were Buddhists) so that she could 
avoid “…an incident like that after Tak’s death.”122 Although Tak’s death at such a 
young age was a distinct tragedy, in many ways it served a purpose within the collective 
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community by helping to maintain positive Muslim-Buddhist relationships and allowing 
local people to find compromises that avoided the creation of more contentious situations 
in the future. 
E. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS FOR VIOLENCE IN PATANI 
1. Patani’s Cultural Influences of Violence 
Much like Satun, the cultural influences of language and religion within Patani 
have contributed to a unique reaction to occur in regards to its relationship with the Thai 
government. Whereas the Satun Muslims were able to resolve these disagreements over 
language and religion peaceably, and to a large degree accept the assimilation process, 
Patani Muslims have not accepted these policies as readily. Their resistance to the Thai 
government’s efforts has quite literally created a situation in which an “irresistible force 
has met an immovable object.” Neither party to this conflict has been willing to 
compromise or capitulate to such a degree that victory can be claimed by either side. 
Unfortunately, this stalemate over whose ethnic narrative should be the dominant 
paradigm has also led to a great number of casualties and deaths over the years, 
especially in the more recent decades since 1947. 
a. Language  
Many researchers have commented on the use and proliferation of 
language as a powerful tool for developing an ethnic identity or unifying national groups. 
Like other SEA countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia, Thai leaders during the early 
1900s recognized the importance of standardizing both speech and print throughout the 
country in order to create a commonly shared identity and standardize the means of 
communication on a national scale. In Patani, the local dialect of Jawi had been used for 
centuries, but suddenly this long-standing and fundamental cultural practice was declared 
unacceptable and contradictory to the linguistic practices that a “true Thai” citizen should 
be able to demonstrate. One example of how strongly the Thai government opposed the 
presence or use of any languages other than Thai in the country can be seen in Phibun’s 
“Announcement of the Office of the Prime Minister on State-ism (No. 9)” which directed 
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the proper and accepted use of the Thai language in a fashion that reflected a true 
“belonging” to the larger national ethnic group: 
As the government deems that the continuity and progress of Thailand 
depends on the usage of the national language and alphabet as important 
elements, the Council of Ministers has thereby unanimously voted to 
proclaim the following to be the state preference: 
Thais must respect, show esteem, and venerate the Thai language, and feel 
honored to speak or to use the Thai language. 
Thais must recognize that one of the civic duties of being a good citizen is 
to study Thai which is the national language, at least until being literate. 
Secondly, people of Thai nationality must consider as their duty to help, 
advise, and convince other citizens who do not know the Thai language or 
are not able to read Thai to become literate in Thai. 
Thais must not regard the place of birth, domicile, residence, or local 
dialects which varies from locality to locality as marks of differences 
(rift). Everyone must consider that being born as a Thai means that he has 
Thai blood and speaks the same Thai language. There is no (inherent) 
conflict in being born in different localities or speaking the Thai language 
in different dialects.  
Given on 24 June, Buddhist Era 2483 [1940]. 123 
Although it may be understandable to some observers that this mandate 
was attempting to create a larger sense of national identity throughout a heterogeneous 
population, it completely ignored the possibility that not everyone in the country would 
be willing to agree with this initiative or actually decide to obey the directive. The 
linguistic traits that Phibun was attempting to expunge in the Patani region had existed 
for centuries and were viewed as extremely important to the Patani Muslim’s concept of 
self-identity and cultural practices.  
In addition, language can also help to define other groups, in a similar 
fashion to how the Muslims of Satun were labeled as “Sam Sams” to reflect the fact that 
they were Muslims who largely spoke Thai. Unfortunately the labels used in the 
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relationship between the Thai government and the Patani Muslims are sometimes much 
more pejorative in nature. The name Khaek (“visitor” or “dark”), for example, is 
frequently used to describe the Patani Muslims and although this term is also used to 
describe foreigners (such as Indians or Arabs), it carries a negative connotation that is 
insulting to Patani Muslims due to the fact that their ancestors have lived in the region for 
at least 600 years.124 The Patani Muslims, on the other hand, often refer to anyone who is 
not a Muslim as Kafir (“unbeliever” or “infidel”) a label that again underscores and 
reinforces the fundamental differences between these two groups, a concept that there is a 
sense of “us” and then there is the inferior category of “them.” 
b. Religion  
Much like the influences of history and language, religion is another 
critical factor in the creation of a binding and enduring sense of ethnic identity in 
southern Thailand. For the national government, the adherence to the practices of 
Theravada Buddhism was one of the defining elements of what it meant to be “Thai.” 
This belief had long established roots in the north portion of the country that stretched 
back to the 13th century and was subsequently strengthened through its ties to the 
monarchy and later to the national government.125 For Patani, Islam had come to fill a 
similar role in the south, which reflected its closer ties to the Malay culture than the 
majority Buddhist paradigm. Islamic practices in this region provided authority to local 
leaders, guided the ethical considerations of their day-to-day activities, and tied the local 
Patani Muslims to a proud history of Islamic scholarship. This comprehensive and deeply 
connected relationship between Islam and the Patani cultural identity  has been described 
as one in which “Islam plays a vital role in their way of life as it represents a complete 
system, embracing not only ethical and religious but also political, social, and economic 
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concerns.”126 The developments of the early 20th century (1902–1922) marked a major 
turning point in Siam where the religious component of ethnic identity on both a regional 
and national scale would become a key driver of the conflict between the dominant ethnic 
group in the north and a smaller ethnic group in the south. Surin Pitsuwan describes this 
particular condition as one in which: 
Culturally, the Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand belong to the Malay 
world. Politically, they are part of the Thai nation-state whose state 
religion is Buddhism. While the state is trying to cultivate a sense of 
belonging among these people, their traditional ties to their culture tend to 
keep them apart from the mainstream.127 
This divide between Buddhism and Islam is more pronounced in the 
Patani region when compared to Satun. Observers have reported that a sizable number of 
the Muslim communities in Patani are exclusive in their interactions with other religious 
groups. Frequently, Patani is characterized as a devout and pious Muslim region. . Some 
of the indicators of these traits can be noticed in social phenomenon such as the low rates 
of intermarriages between religious groups (e.g., a Muslim marrying a Buddhist or vice 
versa), and in the frequency of Muslims attending community events that are held in 
locations such as Buddhist temples. Often, the Patani Mulsims felt that they could safely 
attend these social events and festivals in the community due to the increasing levels of 
multiculturalism and democratization that occurred in the 1990s. This trend has been in 
decline however, most notably after martial law was declared in southern Thailand during 
2004.128 This development is troubling in many regards because it indicates a drift away 
from the cultivation of positive associational relationships with other religious groups or 
individuals and an increasing trend of isolation and distrust,  
                                                 
126 Uthai Dulyakasem, “Malay-Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand: Factors Underlying the 
Political Revolt.” In Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia, ed. Lim Joo-Jock et al. (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), 219. 
127 Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay nationalism: A Case Study of Malay-Muslims of Southern 
Thailand (Bangkok: Thammasat University, 1985), 28. 
128 Michael Jerryson, “Appropriating a Space for Violence: State Buddhism in Southern Thailand,” 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 40, no. 1 (2009): 33–57. 
81 
 
2. Patani’s Institutional Causes of Violence 
In addition to its strong ethnic character and independent identity, Patani also has 
been subjected to a number of institutional influences within Thailand that have added a 
great deal of impetus to the potential for violence to occur in the region. Among these 
institutional factors, elements such as public education, center-periphery relationship 
between Bangkok and Patani, a lack of political representation, and the actions of 
government security forces deployed to this region have all been critical in shaping the 
ongoing “southern problem” in Thailand. 
a. Education  
The planning and implementation of educational systems is by far one of 
the most pressing and critical issues for the Patani provinces. The Thai government’s 
initiatives to implement a national curriculum standard with a heavy emphasis on secular 
education and learning the Thai language has been frequently cited as one of the more 
salient grievances Patani Muslims voice against the government. As noted earlier in the 
historical analysis of Patani, the region has a long-standing tradition of Islamic 
scholarship and learning. Despite the Thai government’s initiatives to standardize schools 
with a country-wide model that reinforces a “Thai” identity, there has been an immense 
amount of resistance to this effort throughout Patani in order to maintain the presence and 
independence of local Islamic schools (Pondoks) or Mosques as centers of education. 
These religious schools are viewed as critical institutions by local residents in 
maintaining the region’s unique culture, values, language, and identity. As a result, the 
Thai government’s efforts to control curriculum or co-opt religious leaders has been 
viewed by some as a direct attack on the Patani Muslim’s cultural identity. Currently in 
Patani there are more than 319 pondoks, which is in stark contrast to the two Pondoks 
located in Satun.129  
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There is also a close linkage between the national education system and 
how it has been used as a vehicle for the implementation of Thai as a national language. 
Many of the classes in nationally sponsored schools are taught by Thai instructors, using 
Thai as the conversational language in the classroom, supported by textbooks with Thai 
script, and teaching a secular curriculum that is developed by the national education 
ministry in Bangkok. These factors make the potential immersion and education of young 
Muslim students in the Thai language both frequent and enduring. Frequently, the Thai 
government incentivizes this process by tying allocations of funding or other types of 
support to the condition that schools in Patani teach the secular curriculum that helps to 
reinforce concepts of Thai citizenship, values, and history, a policy that is problematic for 
Thailand’s southern Muslims who want to maintain and pass on their cultural heritage to 
the younger generations in the region.  
b. Center-Periphery Relations  
Another aspect of institutional influence that has contributed to increased 
levels of violence in Patani is the nature of center-periphery relations between Bangkok 
and the southernmost regions of Thailand. Ever since the national government began to 
pursue a policy of direct control in the early 20th century, an initiative that removed a 
large amount of local authority and power from Patani elites, the relationship between the 
two has become increasingly contentious. This has been clearly demonstrated by the 
number of rebellions, revolts, and protests in the south against what has been viewed as 
intrusive and overbearing policy decisions on the part of the government, especially in 
the realms of language, education, politics, and regional security. Furthermore, this 
problem is not just about the actual events that have occurred from a historical 
perspective, but also how the conflict is being interpreted during the 21st century as well. 
The Thai national media is one barometer of this seriously dysfunctional 
relationship. In papers, television programs, and radio broadcasts, there is a tendency to 
depict the problems in the south from a fairly prejudicial and one-sided perspective. As 
Sanitsuda Ekachai points out in the article “What’s Lacking in the News? Truth,” Thai 
newspapers and television often report on the southern conflict in terms that reinforce the 
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greater Thai public belief that the problem is entirely about separatism or simply the work 
of Muslim insurgents.130 Because of this skewed portrayal of the issue, it frequently leads 
the average Thai citizen to support government repression in the south and fosters an 
opinion that the Muslims in Patani are “less Thai” (which can also be interpreted as “less 
patriotic”) than the larger majority and therefore deserve whatever travails befall them. 
Ekachai argues for media coverage that accurately and fairly reports on the issues and 
problems found in the southern communities and populations of Patani to help create 
understanding and opportunities for compromise. In many regards, issues such as 
injustice, lack of economic opportunity, and ethnic discrimination are critical concerns to 
these fractious areas and it is entirely possible that addressing these base conditions may 
help address the problem of violence much more effectively rather than just painting the 
issue with a broad and distorted brush.   
c. Political Representation  
Another institutional factor that has proven to be problematic for Patani is 
the lack of locally elected Muslim leaders and the ability of the Patani Muslims to 
participate in the Thai political process. Often, this attempt to gain political representation 
was rebuffed by Thai officials and the national leadership would simply install various 
officials from Bangkok who were frequently seen as either indifferent to the local 
citizens’ concerns, incompetent, corrupt, or highly abusive. Historically, we can observe 
some grievous abuses of power and violent attempts to suppress Muslim political leaders 
on the part of the national government. One example of this latter trend can be seen in the 
case of Haji Sulong and his attempts to redress southern grievances after he published his 
“seven points” in 1947. During that year, Haji Sulong drafted a set of political reforms 
and appeals to the Thai government that requested the southern provinces be granted: 
1. The appointment of a single individual with full powers to govern 
the four provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Setul [Satun] 
and in particular having authority to dismiss, suspend, or replace 
all government servants, this individual to be local-born in one of 
the four provinces and to be elected by the people; 
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2. Eighty percent of government servants in the four provinces to be 
Muslims;  
3. Malay and Siamese to be official languages;  
4. Malay to be the medium of instruction in the primary schools;  
5. Muslim law to be recognized and enforced in a separate Muslim 
Court other than the civil court where the one time kathi sat as an 
assessor;  
6. All revenue and income derived from the four provinces to be 
utilized within them;  
7. The formation of a Muslim Board having full powers to direct all 
Muslim affairs under the supreme authority of the head of state 
mentioned in (1.)131 
Although some of these requests, such as having Malay be the sole 
language in primary schools could be viewed as ethnically divisive, many of them are 
centered on being granted a degree of equal rights and justice within Thai legal or 
economic institutions. Furthermore, although the Thai government viewed these points as 
“seditious,” the reality is that they were not designed to pursue secession or achieving 
independence in the south, but in fact were about providing a degree of concessions and 
compromise for the ethnoreligious identity of the Patani Muslims. Additionally, they 
were drafted with the goal of gaining a greater level of political representation and 
participation within the country, qualities that are frequently cited as the hallmarks of an 
inclusive and democratic society. Haji Sulong was jailed for his efforts and after several 
years of incarceration was released from Thai custody in 1952.  
An even more disturbing aspect in this case is the fact that Haji Sulong 
disappeared under suspicious circumstances two years later when he was called into the 
Police Special Branch Office one evening in Songkhla Province. Although it was never 
proven, there are allegations that Haji Sulong and his oldest son Wan Othan Ahmad were 
killed that night by Thai police forces. Dark rumors abounded that these killings were 
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committed under the direction of General Phao Siyanon, and that the two men had been 
tied to heavy stones and then thrown into the sea behind Nu Island.132 In many respects, 
even though this allegation of outright murder is nearly impossible to prove, the fact 
remains that Sulong is one of many people who have “disappeared” in southern Thailand, 
a troubling issue which reflects an atmosphere of political repression and fear that has 
been seen in several other authoritarian countries like Argentina and Chile. It should 
therefore be of little surprise that locals are frequently hesitant to openly criticize Thai 
policies or willing to work towards political solutions through non-violence and 
engagement. 
d. Security Forces and Domestic Order  
One of the more prominent failures of the Thai government in attempting 
to resolve the southern conflict has been in the realm of fielding effective security forces 
and ensuring domestic order. Ideally, national security forces should consist of trained 
professionals who are respected by local citizens for their effective provision of security 
for all citizens, restraint, and adherence to the rule of law. When these representatives of 
the government fail to meet these obligations, it can often be construed as a breach of the 
social contract that exists between the government and the population they are charged 
with protecting. The historical cases of Haji Sulong and Dusun Nyor are just a few early 
examples of where Thai security forces have shown themselves to have a propensity for 
undisciplined violence and inflicting large amounts of collateral damage in their attempts 
to suppress the southern conflict. Even in the modern era of the 21st century, the Royal 
Thai Army (RTP) and the Royal Thai Police (RTP) have accrued a predominantly  
negative record for human rights abuses in Patani and two particular events stand out as 
particularly egregious in this regard—the 2004 Krue-Se Mosque incident and the Tak Bai 
massacre—both of which have been subsequently used as rallying points for violent 
resistance.   
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In January 2004, a RTA camp in Narathiwat was raided by approximately 
100 Malay militants who absconded with over 300 small arms to include machine guns, 
rocket propelled grenades, and assault rifles. The Thai Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra responded to this event by deploying several thousand additional soldiers and 
policemen into Patani to enforce martial law and counter what the government now 
admitted was a growing conflict with a new generation of Muslim separatists.133 Many of 
the RTA and RTP forces were poorly trained and ill-prepared to operate in the ethnic 
landscape of southern Thailand, which ultimately produced disastrous results. In April 
2004, Thai military forces stormed the Krue-Se Mosque in Pattani province (one of the 
most holy and revered sites in the region) after 32 armed insurgents barricaded 
themselves inside of the main Mosque. In the ensuing battle, all 32 insurgents were killed 
without quarter. Many of the bodies bore signs of torture and summary execution when 
they were claimed by their relatives for burial. This incident caused widespread distrust 
and fear in the local community of both RTA and RTP forces and provided Muslim 
insurgents with superb propaganda material in their future recruiting efforts against the 
Thai government.134 In Malaysia, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic party and other international 
observers vehemently protested these killings and called for investigations to determine 
what had taken place at Krue–Se, to which Thaksin replied in just one of several callous 
statements: 
Please don’t intervene. Please leave us alone. It is my job and we can cope 
with this matter. We are trying to explain this to foreigners. But if they do 
not understand or ignore our explanation, I don’t care because we are not 
begging them for food.135 
In October 2004, relations between the Thai government and its southern 
regions deteriorated yet again after a civil disturbance in the town of Tak Bai was 
violently suppressed by Thai military units. After crowds had formed at Tak Bai to 
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demonstrate against the government, hundreds of Muslim protestors were arrested, 
bound, beaten, and then stacked like firewood up to five layers deep in the back of 
government trucks. By the time these vehicles arrived at the RTA holding facility in 
Inkhayut several hours later, 78 of the protestors had already suffocated to death. 
Thaksin’s explanation for the deaths was that the protestors must have died “because they 
were so weak from fasting for Ramadan.”136 The Tak Bai incident not only drove an even 
larger wedge between Thailand and the southern communities but also alienated relations 
with Muslim-majority countries worldwide. Within days of this incident, there were 
numerous condemnations from the Malaysian Parliament, political parties such as United 
Malays National Organization (UMNO) as well as the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), 
and even the former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed commented that the 
situation was quickly beginning to resemble the unrest in Palestine and perhaps some 
form of regional autonomy should be considered.137 In many respects, the Thai security 
forces unwittingly helped their opposition by providing a propaganda goldmine: shortly 
after these incidents occurred, additional fliers and pamphlets were distributed in the 
region describing the brutality and racism of the government in both of these events and 
added fuel to the argument that Thai security forces were in the business of killing 
Muslims with impunity and reckless abandon. 
Domestic order has been a huge problem as well, especially in the 
aftermath of the Narathiwat armory raids, Krue-Se Mosque attack, and Tak Bai 
demonstrations. One of the methods that the Thai government employed to enforce 
domestic order was the issuance of an “emergency decree” on 16 July 2005. This decree 
essentially removed the legal and administrative safeguards that in theory provided 
protection from human rights violations by government officials, despite the fact that 
these freedoms were guaranteed by the Thai Constitution of 1997 and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Human rights groups were appalled by 
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this development as it indicated a more heavy-handed approach to this situation that 
threatened to aggravate the conflict and gave Thai security forces immense powers that 
could be easily abused. For example, Thai citizens were now subject to arrest and 
detention without any charges being levied against them. Many observers feared that this 
denial of basic constitutional and legal rights could easily lead to increasingly malevolent 
behavior such as people being tortured to confess their guilt, causing citizens to suddenly 
“disappear,” or blatantly executing suspects without any legal proceedings or  judicial 
accountability for officials whatsoever. In one particularly prominent case, a southern 
Thai Muslim lawyer by the name of Somchai Nelapaijit had reported to the National 
Human Rights Commission that RTP security forces had subjected detainees suspected of 
insurgent activity to severe beatings, suffocation with water or plastic bags, and electric 
shocks to their thighs or testicles in order to get them to confess or provide information 
on other suspects. Chillingly, Somchai disappeared in 2004, shortly after he began to 
report on the government abuses in southern Thailand and defend survivors in court. To 
date, his body has never been recovered and no one in the Thai government has been held 
accountable, despite strong indications that the Thai police were responsible.  
3. Patani’s Rational Choice Influences for Violence 
Much like the Muslims in Satun, the Muslim populations of Patani have also 
engaged in rational choice calculations regarding the use of violence. Unlike Satun, 
however, where violence has been rejected as a tool for dispute resolution, it appears that 
segments of the Patani Muslim population have decided that many of the other options to 
resolve their grievances with the Thai government, such as political representation or 
legal appeals, have invariably failed. As a result, violent resistance has become a frequent 
expression of the frustration and anger that residents of Patani feel toward Bangkok. This 
simmering anger has been compounded by the fact that these communities believe they 
have no other outlets for pursuing recourse to their grievances. Many Muslims in Patani 
also feel threatened in terms of their cultural survival on a macro or national level and 
sometimes have begun to view neighboring religious communities as potential 
adversaries or threats on a local level. This fear and distrust is a compounding problem in 
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which there are increasingly rare opportunities for constructive interaction between these 
different groups. With all of these challenges in mind, it should be of little surprise that 
the propensity for people in Patani to utilize violence as a solution for their grievances is 
much higher than it is in Satun. 
a. The Failure of Traditional Conflict Resolution Methods  
Ideally, societies have some type of method to conduct conflict resolution 
that prevents their citizens from having to ultimately resort to violence to solve their 
differences. In ancient times, individuals like King Solomon were seen as the ultimate 
arbiter of disputes and a source of wisdom for finding effective compromises between 
citizens or groups. There may be the chance of pursuing legal avenues of redress through 
the courts, judges, and attorneys who are willing to represent an individual’s grievances. 
Political methods of conflict resolution may allow elected leaders in the community to 
lobby with elements of the national government for solutions to constituents’ concerns 
and issues. Religious leaders are also widely recognized in many societies as symbols of 
morality and ethics who can help avoid bloodshed by facilitating negotiations as well. 
The process by which these actors can initiate effective dispute resolution methods can be 
compared to the pressure relief valve on a steam cooker. When they are present, they can 
allow points of contention to be mitigated without exploding into disorder. If they are 
repeatedly undermined or restricted, tensions and pressure in a society can build to a 
point where violence may result. In many of the examples we have seen in Patani, 
traditional agents of mediation, such as legal redress, political participation, and religious 
mediation have frequently been suppressed or eliminated. One particularly telling 
example of this was the elimination of Civilian Military Police Task Force 43 (CMP-43) 
and the Southern Border Provinces Administration Center (SBPAC) in 2002. 
CMP-43 and SBPAC were two agencies formed in the 1980s by 
Thailand’s Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda (1980–1988) who was a former general in 
the Thai Army. After his appointment, Prem quickly implemented a wide range of 
military, political, and economic solutions to reduce the presence and activity of the 
BRN, PULO, CPT and PLAT during his time in office. Rather than simply pursuing 
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military campaigns against these opposition groups, PM Prem also engaged in 
diplomacy, compromise, and institution building in order to reduce the conflict. For 
example, in 1982 Prem promoted government order 65/2525 which encouraged CPT 
cadres to defect, offered them amnesty, and gave out economic incentives (such as 
pensions and an established home in “peace villages” along Thailand’s southern border) 
to those who surrendered and laid down their arms. 138 Concurrently, the Prem regime 
also engaged with China and Malaysia to deny financial backing, logistic support, and 
border safe havens to the CPT and PLAT which drastically reduced the Communist 
insurgent’s ability to operate within Thailand.  
In addition to these efforts, Prem created several effective institutions to 
deal with the Patani Muslim separatist issue as well. In 1981, Prem organized the 
SBPAC, assigned it under the management of the Interior Ministry (rather than placing it 
under the auspices of the Defense Ministry) and physically located its headquarters in 
Yala Province. In the years to follow, SBPAC had several critical functions in reducing 
the insurgency problems in southern Thailand. It helped to educate the Thai politicians 
and civil servants who were assigned to southern posts on the nuances of Thai Malay 
Muslim culture. The SBPAC also often served as a conduit for information, 
communication, and intelligence to be exchanged between Bangkok and the provincial 
leaders in the south. Perhaps most importantly, SBPAC allowed grievances from the 
south to be heard and resolved before they grew into more widespread points of 
contention. In conjunction with the SBPAC, Prem also directed the establishment of the 
CMP-43. CMP-43 was a joint unit composed of local security forces along with elements 
of the Royal Thai Army (RTA) that worked directly for the SBPAC in coordinating all 
security and policing operations in the south. CMP-43 maintained good working 
relationships with local leaders and citizens and, as a result, CMP-43 was able to gain 
high quality intelligence and cooperation from the population in order to execute 
effective follow-on operations. Under Prem’s leadership, the focus was on implementing 
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indirect counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies, developing effective institutions for justice 
and participation, and pursuing economic stability within Thailand. This was a dramatic 
change from the authoritarian enforcement measures seen in previous administrations that 
overwhelmingly utilized military operations to crack down on dissent. As a result, the 
1990s were relatively calm throughout Southern Thailand and many observers quietly 
theorized that perhaps the days of insurgent violence and bloodshed had become a thing 
of the past.  
After PM Thaksin assumed office in 2001, he decided to disband the 
SBPAC and CMP-43 during 2002 because he believed that insurgent and separatist 
violence was no longer a threat within Thailand. This action effectively severed the direct 
links of command and control between the central government and the local officials and 
citizens in the south. As a result, intelligence collection efforts were abruptly brought to a 
halt and the ability to coordinate effective operations in the region disintegrated. 
Thaksin’s elimination of these agencies also removed the established grievance resolution 
process for Thai citizens in the south. Many Patani Muslims now had no one to whom 
they could appeal their plight when they had suffered under the leadership of corrupt 
officials, faced indiscriminate physical abuse at the hands of RTP security forces, or had 
lost access to vital economic resources required to support their families (such as fishing 
or agriculture) to “big business” interests from Bangkok.139 This void fueled local anger 
and a sense of abandonment toward the elected political leaders in Bangkok. As a result, 
violence has become viewed in Patani as a valid option to bring attention to these 
problems on a local, national, and international scale. 
b. Thai Nationalism as a Direct Threat to Patani Muslim Culture 
The goals of self-preservation and survival are primordial drives that most 
creatures, including humans, will frequently fight tooth and nail to achieve. In the case of 
Patani, the assimilation process that was aggressively promoted by the Thai government 
at various points in history raised fears of cultural survival. Many of the directives and 
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policies handed down from the Thai government denied Patani the rights to practice 
religious law, use their own language, educate their children as they saw fit, and dress in 
the same traditional garb that they had been wearing for hundreds of years. If Patani 
accepted these directives from what they viewed as an illegitimate non-Islamic 
government, it would not only be tantamount to a grievous sin within the culture (to turn 
away from Islam) but it would also mark a death knell for the practices and beliefs that 
were critical components to the sustainment of the region’s cultural identity, ethnic 
history, and religious practices. In many regards, this was an unacceptable option, so 
multiple attempts at political protest and lobbying were made by Patani leaders and social 
elites. When these efforts at appeals or mediation were rejected by the Thai government, 
many Patani Muslims began to fear that the assimilation policies would continue to be 
relentlessly enforced until local Islamic culture was completely eliminated. When faced 
with the choice of resistance or cultural extinction, some Patani Muslims decided to resist 
violently as a means to ensure their chances of cultural and political survival. 
c. A Possible Security Dilemma Between Buddhists and Muslims  
One common theme in international relations and the ethnic conflict 
literature that is quite applicable to the region of Patani is that of the “security 
dilemma.”140 This precept holds that actors in Community A are likely to begin to acquire 
weapons in order to protect themselves from perceived hostile neighbors in Community 
B. Once the neighbors in Community B (who may not have actually had any hostile 
intent in the first place) see the residents of Community A transforming their homes, 
religious centers, and places of business into fortified compounds and arming themselves, 
the citizens of Community B begin to also arm themselves in order to defend against 
Community A. This is the heart of the security dilemma: a rush toward gaining a greater 
sense of safety that may in fact paradoxically make everyone less safe as fear and 
uncertainty grow, shootings begin to increase, and any hope of maintaining a civil society 
quickly decay. In Thailand, this type of phenomenon has been documented by a number 
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of different observers and authors and shows the potential cleavages that have developed 
along religious or political lines. One aspect of this potential security dilemma between 
communities in southern Thailand is the availability of firearms and how the proliferation 
of these light weapons may aggravate existing tensions between local communities and 
the state.141  
In particular, the Thai government has provided weapons to local Buddhist 
communities and elected officials throughout the Patani region via three main avenues, 
specifically subsidizing gun purchases, relaxing restrictions on firearms ownership, and 
providing small arms to civilian defense forces.142 Although these practices are 
ostensibly described by the Thai government as being conducted to protect local 
Buddhists from insurgent attackers, it begs the question about how local Muslims 
interpret these activities: Is it meant to protect the community as a whole? Or does the 
funneling of these weapons to Buddhist organizations signify a more threatening goal? 
Considering that her Majesty the Queen has formed an “Iron Lady Unit” (in which 
female volunteers are paid to carry firearms, patrol local villages, and provide security for 
schools and Buddhist temples), and the firearms application process within Thailand is 
one which is notoriously difficult for Muslims to successfully pass, this sectarian 
development could very easily be viewed as a process of preferential treatment for 
Buddhists and create a local arms race in which the central government is aggressively 
supporting Buddhist armament while simultaneously denying this same right to Muslims. 
In light of this perceived insecurity, it is entirely possible that groups of Patani Muslims 
will increasingly prepare themselves for acts of violence against neighboring Buddhist 
enclaves in order to defend against possible predation or attack. 
                                                 
141 Diana Sarosi and Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, “Arming Civilians for Self-defense: The Impact of 
Firearms Proliferation on the Conflict Dynamics in Southern Thailand,” Global Change, Peace & Security, 
23, no. 3 (2011): 387–403. 
142 Ibid., 389. 
94 
 
d. The Breakdown of Civil Society and the “Purging” of 
Communities 
The concept of a “civil society” holds that the nature of the relationships 
that people develop, in both associational and everyday activities, will influence how they 
will interact with each other. In societies where these types of relationships are frequent 
and deep, the occurrence of violence tends to be quite low.143 Conversely, in communities 
where there is a lack of connections between individuals and groups, communication and 
understanding begin to break down. Instead, distrust, animosity, and intolerance can start 
to fester and violence tends to increase. Once these perceptions or labels between groups 
become rampant and groups polarize along ethnic, religious, or political lines, sometimes 
it is only a matter of having some sort of flashpoint event take place, such as a rumor that 
a rape has occurred, some sort of small altercation breaks out, or an actual injury or 
fatality within an ethnic group at the hands of a rival ethnic group takes place. Once one 
of these triggering events takes place, riots, purges, or “cleansing” can result in fairly 
short order. Despite the savage Darwinian nature of this analysis, the utility of this type 
of decision becomes quite apparent when we consider the potential for reducing conflict 
when a community is created that is more homogenous in terms of ethnic or religious 
makeup. Once the “other” groups in the area, who may be seen as a source of endemic 
problems, are driven away there is a belief that peace will be restored.  
This disintegration of civil society and the resulting violence this situation 
may create can actually be seen in a variety of settings and time periods outside of 
Thailand. For example, in the aftermath of the 1947 British partition of India and 
Pakistan, communal violence and ethnic cleansing took place with frightening regularity 
between groups of Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs, resulting in casualty figures of between 
500,000 and 1 million people  killed and another 10 million Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh 
familes driven from their homes in massive population transfers. This decay of civil 
society has also been studied more recently by Ashutosh Varshney when he investigated 
communal riots that took place throughout India during the 1990s. Varshney observed 
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that in small villages or towns where everyday interactions were commonplace violence 
was frequently minimized. As the communities became larger (towns and cities), it was 
impossible for all the residents to have direct interactions with everyone else in the 
municipality and there was a risk of disassociation taking place between communities. As 
a result, Varshney argues that “associational civic engagement is necessary for peace in 
interethnic urban settings.” 144  
Thailand is no different in many regards. Despite the ethnic and religious 
differences in Patani, local religious enclaves frequently provided a venue for the entire 
community, both Muslims and Buddhists alike, to gather together and observe common 
events such as the King’s birthday or Songkran (Thai New Year). This association has 
broken down in the 21st century as attacks on local groups of Muslims and Buddhists 
began to cause an environment of fear, suspicion, and anger.145 When the opportunity for  
day-to-day interactions or community forums for communication begins to decrease it 
causes a corresponding drop in yet another alternative channel for dispute resolution to 
take place. This sociocultural distance between communities makes it easier in many 
regards to vilify neighboring ethnic groups, attempt to push the “other” out, and thereby 
ensure a safe community is established. This entire process may indicate a rational choice 
process to defend one’s home and family on either side of this conflict by forcing other 
ethnic groups to move away from the area.146 
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In conclusion, we can see that although Satun shares several similar qualities with 
its neighbors in the Patani region, such as Islamic beliefs, early political structures (i.e., 
being part of a sultanate), and historical ties to Malaysia, Satun has also demonstrated a 
number of distinct factors that have contributed to this particular province eschewing the 
use of violence against the state. Although many of the influences and factors we have 
discussed throughout the course of this thesis have helped contribute in totality to the 
outcome of Satun’s nonviolent nature, it appears that three elements are of particular 
importance to the discussion of this evolutionary process and the final observed outcome 
of nonviolence. These three primary factors include: 1.) The development of a divergent 
ethnic identity within Satun, 2.) a lack of regional grievances in Satun about poor 
governance at the hands of the Thai government, and 3.) a collective decision that was 
made by the population within Satun about how to interact with the Thai government writ 
large, specifically that this region generally decided to cooperate with the Thai 
government because of the many benefits this course of action provided.  
One of the most fundamental differences we find in Satun is that the local 
population in this province has developed a dramatically different ethnic identity as “Sam 
Sams” compared to what has evolved in Patani. In a macro sense, this has been generated 
by the historical record in which Satun has always existed as a “periphery” polity or 
region, first falling under the control of the Sultanate of Kedah, then in subsequent years 
being brought under the control of the Siamese government. As a result, there was not the 
same sense of loss and injury felt in Satun like there was in Patani when the Satun 
Muslims were faced with national policies of assimilation. Another contrast in the ethnic 
identity between the two regions can be gained by examining them in regards to relative 
ethnic power or self-identity. This influence can be demonstrated by the fact that Satun 
did not possess the same sort of widespread prestige and territorial control that the Patani 
sultanate enjoyed during 1500 to 1700 CE. Satun was never recognized as a powerful 
independent sultanate or a well-known center of Islamic learning, and this helped to 
98 
 
shape the ethnic identity and historical heritage of Satun to be less pronounced and 
contentious than what is frequently found in Patani. For example, we do not find a flag 
being created that represents the resurrection of “the greater state of Satun.” Even the 
published manifestos which include Satun in this type of political vision (i.e., the creation 
of an autonomous Patani state) have no resonance with the people in Satun. The absence 
of strong familial structures or royal lineages in Satun also also contributed to the lack of 
violence as well. Prior to 1900 when the last Raja of Satun died, he was replaced with an 
alternative leader who was acceptable to both the center and the periphery. In Patani, 
these historical leaders were still very strong when they were forcibly removed by the 
Thai government and as a result, the displaced Patani Rajas simply continued their ability 
to lead the people under their control from alternate locations such as Malaya. Another 
aspect of this ethnic identity in Satun is that it was very fluid and malleable in nature. 
This flexibility allowed the Sam Sams to easily adapt and assimilate more readily to the 
dramatically changing conditions that developed within Thailand from 1902–1957. This 
is a dramatic comparison to the ethnic nature of Patani, which was more stringent and 
inflexible in its views of the world around it. On a micro level, we have seen how the use 
of language was largely a non-issue within Satun. It appears that as early as 1813, when 
the Siamese government began to extend increased amounts of administrative control 
over the population of Satun, this region was able to more readily identify themselves as 
being “Thai” rather than “Malay.” This frame of reference and political orientation 
towards Bangkok has created a situation in which a long running conflict over competing 
ethnic narratives has failed to develop in Satun. 
For the region of Patani, one of the key components in the ongoing conflict and 
violence is the long standing historical and ethnic roots that are driving it. It appears that 
these particular elements are some of the primary causes for the rather exclusive nature of 
the violence in Patani and has heavily contributed to keeping this conflict as a localized 
or regional problem within a particular part of the country rather than expanding to other 
communities. In a larger sense, this violence has also been centered on various aspects of 
power and control between the center and the periphery. It is understandable in some 
regards why the Thai government leaders implemented many of the controversial and 
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provocative initiatives over the years that they did. Thai elites had a primary concern to 
ensure their own national survival and they were also attempting to create a common 
frame of ethnic identity for all of the citizens under their stewardship to embrace. 
Unfortunately, there was a lack of cultural understanding and ability to compromise on 
the part of Thai leaders when this national agenda for standardizing citizenship was 
adopted. They did not fully comprehend exactly how contentious these initiatives were 
for some segments of the population in Patani. The fear and discontent it caused 
throughout southern Thailand should have been an indicator to the government that trying 
to implement these changes by force would only make the situation worse. Because the 
Patani Muslims saw these efforts as a direct threat to the long standing beliefs and ethnic 
identity that they had maintained for centuries they would never easily acquiesce to 
abandon these beliefs. When it became clear that in a larger sense there would be no hope 
for compromise, many residents of Patani felt that violence was the only option that they 
had left to them.  
In addition to Satun having a very different ethnic identity, the Thai government 
itself has had a direct hand in creating the conditions in Satun by avoiding the use of 
violent methods of suppression and control that it frequently employed in Patani. By 
allowing the province of Satun to retain a larger degree of political autonomy and not 
completely usurping the local elites in Satun like it did in Patani, the Thai government 
effectively bridged the divide between the population and the larger national government 
by using local leaders as intermediaries. Satun has also simply not suffered the same 
numbers of injuries and fatalities that has been inflicted on the population of Patani. 
Although it is extremely difficult to argue a counterfactual, it is possible that if similar 
amounts of violence had been inflicted upon Satun, the population there would have 
begun to experience increased levels of anger and frustration as well, perhaps leading to 
armed resistance or violence. The use of force in counterinsurgency doctrine is something 
that needs to be gravely considered and applied very carefully. Many experts in this 
particular field have described how the use of excessive force can actually be 
counterproductive in reducing insurgencies or domestic conflicts, declaring that:  
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The more force you use, the less effective you are. Any use of force 
produces many effects, not all of which can be foreseen. The more force 
applied, the greater the chance of collateral damage and mistakes. Enemy 
propaganda will portray kinetic military activities as brutal. Restrained 
force also strengthens the rule of law the counterinsurgent is trying to 
establish.147 
 
When we look at southern Thailand from a historical perspective, we can see that 
there is a sine wave of violence in which the problems in Patani have peaked during 
certain periods such as 1838, 1923, 1948, 1972, and 2004, and that there are other 
decades where the violence has been noticeably reduced.148 For example, the years 
between 1840 and 1900 had a reduced number of revolts, 1941 to 1945 also showed a lull 
in violence, and during the late-1980s to the early 2000s many of the problems in the 
south with groups such as the CPT and PULO had become almost nonexistent.149 If we 
examine what the Thai government’s activities were during these more violent periods, 
we can quickly ascertain that relations between the Thai government and Patani became 
problematic during years where Thai government repression and intrusion into the  region 
was high and there were no effective institutions in place, or alternative methods for these 
grievances to be vetted or resolved. Conversely, during the periods in which government 
intrusion was minimized and dispute resolution procedures were in place, violence was 
extremely low.  
Lastly, it is evident that some degree of rational choice is at work in Satun. Very 
early in Satun’s history it was recognized that if the Sultante of Kedah could not defend 
Satun against the incursions of the Siamese army, perhaps a more pragmatic approach of 
submission and acceptance was in order. Because Satun accepted the larger narratives 
imposed by the Chakri Dynasty, it quickly appeared to the Siamese leadership that the 
possibility of Satun posing a potential threat to the new Thai government was minimal 
                                                 
147 Elliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath, and Jon Nagl. “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes 
of Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, (2006): 50.  
148 Neil J. Melvin, Neil J. Melvin, “Conflict in Southern Thailand: Islamism, Violence and the State 
in the Patani Insurgency,” SIPRI Policy Paper No. 20, September 2007, 15. 
149 Zachary Abuza, Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 28. 
101 
 
and additional military invasions or local troop deployments were avoided as a result. 
There is also an incentive side to this choice as well. On the positive side, the Thai 
government is willing to invest substantial sums of money in infrastructure and tourism 
developments in regions that are seen as “good investments.” This fact represents an 
economic opportunity that local political and community leaders in Satun are no doubt 
anxious to obtain. From a more negative perspective, the residents of Satun seem to 
express a desire to avoid the potential impacts of government repression or violence that 
are so frequently seen in Patani. It appears that these factors, in their totality, have 
contributed greatly to the peaceful outcome in Satun and it appears that this trend will 
continue in both the immediate and long term future. Patani, on the other hand, has a 
number of reasons for choosing violence as a tool for conflict resolution despite the 
possible negative effects this choice may have had in terms of aggravating the conflict 
between Patani and the Thai government. One such reason for choosing violence was the 
regional concerns about the survival of Patani cultural identities. Entreaties to protect this 
identity were frequently ignored or violently suppressed, and in short order, violence 
became a way to “fight back” or “defend” against the perceived injustices that were being 
inflicted on local communities. Security measures imposed by the Thai government in the 
Patani region since the 1700s have inflicted unnecessary casualties and caused 
widespread anger against the leaders in Bangkok. And lastly, potential methods that 
could be used to address these grievances in Patani, even highly successful ones like the 
establishment of SBPAC and CMP-43 have frequently been either neglected, suppressed, 
or eliminated altogether. When all of these components are combined, it should be of 
little surprise that violence soon becomes seen as a viable option to respond to perceived 
threats.  
This relationship between the Thai government and Patani has continued to  
evolve over the years, and many observers wonder if the undercurrent of this issue is 
slowly drifting from predominantly ethno-nationalist motivations to more religiously 
driven ones. I would argue that two main points exist here: First, although the basis for 
different types of social mobilization may evolve or change over time, the end result is 
the same in that the conflict has continued unabated. Second, both the concepts of 
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ethnicity and religion are closely tied into the formation of a cultural identity as we have 
discussed earlier. As a result, we are still left with the question of how to respond to this 
conflict on either an ethnic or religious level. Although the Patani Muslims are a minority 
when compared to the entire country, they are a distinct ethnic majority when viewed 
from a regional level, which can have the reverse effect on smaller communities of 
Buddhists in Patani: a fear that local Buddhist enclaves may become eclipsed or 
persecuted by the majority presence of Muslims. This is a serious concern on a variety of 
levels and observers fear that there may be future expansion of this problem along these 
lines. In order to counteract this possibility, advocating tolerance, encouraging interaction  
between both community leaders and local citizens, and the development of a 
consociational political environment at both a local and national level will go a long ways 
towards resolving this issue.150 
Following the ouster of Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006, the new military leadership 
organized by Sonthi Boonyaratkalin had pledged to reexamine the issues of national 
governance and ongoing grievances in the south. Despite these conciliatory gestures and 
public apologies for some of the Thai government’s past transgression, the conflict in 
southern Thailand actually intensified in the following year, and the total number of 
people killed in the region rose to over 2,579 by September of 2007.151 Some five years 
later, the Patani region still suffers from a great deal of political neglect and low intensity 
violence that shows no signs of abating anytime soon. After analyzing the historical 
trajectory of this conflict and some of its formative influences, we are left with several 
predictions after examining the problems in southern Thailand: 1) Ethnic conflict will 
continue to be a pressing issue throughout this particular region in the 21st century as 
different minority groups seek to protect their identities, human rights, culture, and 
attempt to participate in national economic and political activities, and 2)  If the Thai 
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government, and the elites who run it, are not willing to compromise with their 
constituents in order to create an inclusive political environment, then violence will most 
likely continue in future years. This failure to provide for an environment of safety and 
security within the country neglects one of the critical components of governance, and 
national leaders have an obligation to solve these problems as quickly and effectively as 
they can if they truly want to bring peace to their communities. In the case of Satun, 
however, we can see how the development of ethnic identities, when properly managed at 
the regional and national levels, provides a deeper sense of “ownership” for local 
communities in terms of their political participation and subsequent interactions with 
national authorities. Once this constructive relationship is established between these two 
actors, it can encourage those same citizens to make rational decisions to avoid the use of 
violence in the short-term horizon and subsequently ensure that this trend continues in the 
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